



ADVANCING THE DIALOGUE

A Security System for the Two-State Solution

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Cover Photo

The top image shows members of the Israeli Border Police. The bottom image shows members of the Palestinian National Security Forces. Both the Israeli and Palestinian security forces will be key components of the security system for the two-state solution detailed in this report. (Getty Images)

A SECURITY SYSTEM FOR THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION

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Key Principles

Israelis will never agree to a two-state solution unless their security concerns are addressed. Palestinians will never agree to what they view as an endless occupation. To address both sides' needs, this report proposes a security system based on the following key principles:

Build a multilayered system that addresses Israel's security concerns in which Israel retains the right of self defense as well as the capacity to defend itself by itself, but ensures this is only necessary in extremis.

Minimize Israeli visibility to Palestinian civilians and pursue significant early steps that signal a fundamental change on the ground to Palestinians.

Plan a conditions-based, performance-dependent area-by-area phased redeployment of Israeli security forces with target timetables, benchmarks, and an effective remediation process.

Conduct significant upgrades to security systems and infrastructure.

Build joint operations centers and data sharing mechanisms for all parties such that there is maximum situational awareness of the security environment for Israelis but minimal intrusion on Palestinian sovereignty.

Employ American forces for training, equipping, evaluating, and monitoring, and for conducting highly limited operations along the Jordan River.

Executive Summary

Confidence in the possibility of solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at a nadir. More than 20 years after Oslo, both sides are deeply disillusioned and trust is nonexistent. The withdrawal from Gaza and ensuing takeover by Hamas, combined with the increasing instability in Syria, Egypt's Sinai, and across the region, have led much of the Israeli public to conclude that for security reasons, Israel cannot move forward on an agreement with the Palestinians. Meanwhile, many Palestinians have decided that Israel has no intention of ever redeploying from the West Bank. And the United States, the Arab world, and the international community in general are focused on more pressing security challenges and frustrated with the lack of progress between Israelis and Palestinians.

Nonetheless, several factors point to the need to produce a public study on security arrangements that would provide better security for both Israelis and Palestinians in a two-state solution:

1. The need to add legitimacy and infuse confidence in some of the key concepts underpinning the two-state solution;
2. The increasing importance that the Israeli public ascribes to the security challenges associated with the two-state solution; and
3. The centrality of security considerations in Israeli reluctance to move toward an agreement.

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that well-thought-through security measures in the context of the two-state solution can provide Israelis and Palestinians with a degree of security equal or greater to that provided today by Israel's deployment into the West Bank, and that such measures can be consistent with Palestinian needs for sovereignty and dignity. In the context of a two-state agreement, Israel would still have the right and ability to defend itself by itself as any sovereign state does. But the intent of this proposed security architecture is to build in a multilayered system so that the need for unilateral Israeli action is vastly reduced to rare emergency situations.

The study also addresses security arrangements for Gaza but in less detail. Part of the challenge is that transition in Gaza would first require the Palestinian Authority to reassert governance and security control of Gaza – an issue beyond the scope of this study. More work will be required on Gaza security arrangements in the future, but many of the concepts described and applied in this study to the West

Bank could also likely be adjusted and implemented in similar form in Gaza.

This paper first provides key principles and objectives of a security architecture for the two-state solution that address Israeli anxieties but are still acceptable to Palestinians. The second section describes the key elements of a proposed security architecture as it would appear at end state, after many years of planned transition. The third part of the study addresses the elements of a transition plan to move both parties safely from the current arrangement to the enduring security architecture we envision – including steps that can begin today even without an agreement.

Finally, it is important to note that we consider this study to be a constant work in progress. The purpose is not to propose the one definitive solution to this challenge, but instead to lay out a series of solutions that should continue to be debated and refined to meet both parties' needs.

Key Principles

The overall security system would be based on the following key principles:

- Build a multilayered system that addresses Israel's security concerns in which Israel retains the right of self defense as well as the capacity to defend itself by itself, but ensures this is only necessary in extremis.
- Minimize Israeli visibility to Palestinian civilians and pursue significant early steps that signal a fundamental change on the ground to Palestinians.
- Plan a conditions-based, performance-dependent area-by-area phased redeployment of Israeli security forces with target timetables, benchmarks, and an effective remediation process.
- Conduct significant upgrades to security systems and infrastructure.
- Build joint operations centers and data sharing mechanisms for all parties such that there is maximum situational awareness of the security environment for Israelis but minimal intrusion on Palestinian sovereignty.
- Employ American forces for training, equipping, evaluating, and monitoring, and for conducting highly limited operations along the Jordan River.

The Security System

The security system would include four mutually reinforcing layers: (1) internal security inside the new Palestinian state (hereafter referred to as Palestine);¹ (2) border security; (3) non-ground domains, including air, maritime, and the electromagnetic spectrum; and (4) regional security.

The internal Palestinian security system would include:

- A non-militarized Palestinian security force (PASF) whose maximum capabilities resemble a gendarmerie model.²
- A small, highly capable Palestinian counterterrorism (CT) unit trained and equipped to a level analogous with a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit of a large American city.
- A full-spectrum, self-contained Palestinian counterterrorism system composed of vetted and protected personnel, including intelligence officers to detect terrorist activity, CT forces to raid sites and arrest perpetrators, forensics experts for site exploitation, pretrial detention officers to ensure prisoners do not escape, prosecutors and judges to conduct trials and issue warrants, and post-trial detention officers to ensure prisoners are not released early; and stand-alone detention facilities.
- Joint operations centers that include Israeli security forces (ISF) and PASF for sharing intelligence, identifying potential targets, and coordinating operations.³
- Multiple mechanisms for rapidly resolving disagreements between the parties on the merits or needs of a particular operation, including among security professionals, at the bilateral political level, and, where required, through American mediation.
- A final option for Israel in extreme situations to act unilaterally to defend itself with the knowledge that it would receive American diplomatic support in the aftermath.

The border security system would include:

- Crossing points between Jordan and the new Palestinian state that would be staffed by the PASF (on the Palestinian side) and Jordanian security forces (JSF) (on the Jordanian side of a crossing) but would include American monitors on the Palestinian side who are qualified to reinspect people or cargo if Israel demands it. During the transition years, Israel would remain responsible for overall security at the crossing points, though with only a low-visibility Israeli presence that over time would transition to

nonvisible and, if technology allows, eventually to electronic monitoring.

- A state-of-the-art traveler database shared by Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians that would include watch lists, biometric data for positive identification, and other relevant information.
- A multilayered border trace security system between Jordan and the new Palestinian state that would include aerostat-borne monitoring systems; redundant physical barriers, sensors, and monitoring systems on the border itself; and patrols conducted by Palestinian and American forces.
- Data from the crossing points for personnel, baggage, and cargo, and data from the border trace security system. This data would feed into a joint border control center that would have representatives from all relevant parties and into individual headquarters elements in each relevant country.
- Many similar concepts that could also be applied to the Egyptian border with Gaza, but these would have to be specifically designed and tailored in the future once Gaza and the West Bank come under unified governance that adheres to the Quartet conditions.
- Completion of the barrier along the agreed lines of final borders between Israel and the new Palestinian state.
- Exceptional security zones in sensitive areas, which would require additional zoning and/or monitoring by security forces and limitations on construction to prevent possible attacks (e.g., on the pathway into Ben Gurion International Airport). These zones would be combined with anti-tunneling technology in order to prevent infiltration near the border.
- A 2-kilometer security zone between Route 90 and the Jordan River, similar to the one that exists now on the Jordanian side of the Jordan Valley, that would be symmetrically enforced on the Palestinian side.

Non-ground domain security would include:

- An airspace security system consisting of vetted personnel, clear air traffic procedures for normal conditions and emergency situations (in which Israeli military air traffic controllers would immediately assume control), up-to-date air traffic control facilities and equipment, and secure airport infrastructure and procedures.
- Sovereign Palestinian airspace above the future state of Palestine from the surface to 10,000 feet mean sea level, and airports in the Jordan Valley and Gaza.

- A multilayered maritime security system in which Palestinians would govern their territorial waters off Gaza, but with an external layer of an Israeli security zone, and standard procedures in international waters, where Israel is free to intercept, board, and inspect any ship (in accordance with international law).
- A Palestinian port either in Gaza or on a man-made island off Gaza with special security procedures analogous to all border-crossing points.
- Significant investments in enhancing the efficiency and use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) by Israelis and Palestinians to increase overall access to EMS for both sides.

A regional security system would include:

- New mechanisms for Israel to work bilaterally and multilaterally with Arab states on common threats, including responding to Islamic extremism and Iranian interference.
- Deeper intelligence cooperation and operational coordination between Israel and Arab states.
- New venues to discuss security-related misunderstandings and peacefully resolve conflicts.
- An “inside envelope” of two sets of trilateral security relationships: one made up of Israel, the future state of Palestine, and Jordan to address issues around the West Bank; and a second related to the Gaza Strip, involving Israel, the Palestinians, and Egypt.
- An “outer envelope” open to Saudi Arabia, its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners, and possibly other states in North Africa and elsewhere, giving Israel an opportunity to engage on broader regional challenges and opportunities.

The Transition Process

When considering how to achieve this security system, it is important to examine both what a transition process would entail after an agreement is concluded as well as important steps that could be taken today to reduce tensions and preserve the conditions for a two-state outcome.

The transition process after an agreement would include the following aspects:

- There would be an initial phase of early steps agreed to by the Israelis to reduce visible Israeli presence and increase Palestinian sovereignty, including an end to Area A incursions; the turning over of significant portions of Area C to Palestinian civic

and security control; early redeployment from the northern quarter of the West Bank where there are relatively few settlements; and rapidly reduced visible Israeli presence on the border crossings between Jordan and Palestine.⁴

- A security implementation verification group (SIVG) consisting of Israeli, Palestinian, and American security professionals would be established to plan and implement the transition.
- The SIVG would provide training to the PASF, and a separate evaluation cell staffed by Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians would judge PASF performance in evaluations and operational tests against clear criteria agreed upon in advance.
- If the SIVG judged that the Palestinians had met a particular series of criteria, then an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) redeployment from a specific area would proceed as planned.⁵ If the Palestinians were judged to have not hit a specific metric, then the SIVG would develop a remediation plan to repair the deficiencies using a target timetable not more than half the length of the initial timetable.
- If after the remediation process disagreement remained about whether criteria had been met, then the issue would be elevated to the political level for Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans to address.

The Most Important Steps That Can Begin Today

- Initiate greater investments and training in key elements of the stand-alone counterterrorism system that will help Israelis and Palestinians combat terrorism today and jump-start the lengthy process of completing the full counterterrorism system.
- Build out the infrastructure, databases, and biometric data for effective border-crossing-points systems, allowing an early handover of responsibility. This is important for Palestinians while also improving overall security at the crossings, which is important to both.
- Initiate the planning processes associated with an airport in the Jordan Valley and a port facility in Gaza. If feasible, move beyond planning, especially if the preferred port option is a man-made island off the coast of Gaza.
- Israel should respond in some way to the Arab Peace Initiative (API), thus beginning to set the table for a broader regional security framework.⁶

The Toughest Questions

Traditionally there have been a number of critical sticking points in security negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. These challenges are outlined below, along with how the proposed security system addresses them.

1

What would be the timetable for completion of Israeli redeployment?

The system can be adapted based on an agreement between the parties, but the authors believe that 10 to 15 years is most realistic and appropriate. However, we strongly advocate a rapid reduction of visible Israeli presence very early in the transition in order to reduce friction in daily Palestinian life as rapidly as possible.

2

What would be the status of the Jordan River and Jordan Valley?

The study offers a number of options, but the authors believe that, after a multiyear transition period during which Israeli forces would redeploy, the most realistic option would be for American forces to remain in a 2-kilometer security zone west of the Jordan River and east of Route 90.

3

Who would make the final decision on Israeli redeployment? Would Israel have a veto?

There would be a professionalized security-criteria-based process in the SIVG that would include Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans. Israel would have a veto in the first round of an evaluation of whether a metric had been met. If after a remediation process Israel continued to object, the issue would be elevated to the political level.

4

Would Israel have a right of re-entry into Palestine in extreme circumstances?

The Palestinians will never agree to an Israeli right of re-entry, but there could be a side agreement between Israel and the United States on the conditions under which the United States would support Israeli unilateral action. Ultimately, Israel is a sovereign state that enjoys the right of self-defense. Thus, it can unilaterally violate the sovereignty of another state, but with the attendant risks that would have to be weighed by Israeli leadership.

5

What about the challenges presented by rocket attacks on Ben Gurion or tunneling into Israel?

Exceptional security zones would be set up near sensitive border areas that would limit certain types of activities that would complicate the ability to guard against these threats. These areas would be some of the last to be transitioned to the Palestinians. And even afterward, U.S. monitors would continue to accompany the PASF to these areas and make it a central benchmark of continued implementation. These zones would be complemented by anti-tunneling technology being developed by Israel with assistance from the United States to block infiltration into Israel. And the multilayered proposed security system, with its robust counterterrorism measures, comprehensive security system on the Jordanian border, and deeper security cooperation with the Arab states, would provide additional layers of defense against this threat.

6

What about even greater regional instability that directly threatens Israel or Palestine?

There could be a side agreement between Israel and the United States establishing a regular consultative process and options for emergency consultations to address these issues. The United States could also provide additional security assurances to some of Israel's neighbors. And the United States could provide necessary security enhancements to address these concerns and, in dire situations, could re-engage the Palestinians on shifting elements of the agreement. But ultimately, Israel must be militarily strong enough to defend itself by itself in these situations, and the United States must remain committed to preserving Israel's qualitative military edge, thus ensuring Israel can withstand such scenarios.



What about “game changers” regarding the governance or security situation inside the future state of Palestine that turn it into a government hostile to Israel?

The multilayered security system, upgrades to Palestinian internal security, and a long-term American monitoring and implementation presence are meant to address this issue and reduce the likelihood of such a scenario. As with changes in the region, there could also be a side agreement between Israel and the United States establishing a regular consultative process and options for emergency consultations to address this scenario. But similar to the question of regional stability, Israel must be militarily strong enough to defend itself by itself in these scenarios. The United States must remain committed to preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge. Ensuring that a future Palestinian state remains non-militarized can also ensure that Israel can withstand such scenarios.

What the Parties Achieve From the Proposed Security System

BOTH PARTIES	ISRAELIS	PALESTINIANS
Upgraded internal security system to counter terrorism and maintain law and order	Retention of the right to act unilaterally in extreme cases outside the security system with U.S. diplomatic support	Immediate steps that quickly reduce intrusive elements of occupation and move steadily to end the occupation
Robust border security system far superior to today’s	Phased redeployment that will take place once Palestinians meet performance criteria agreed to by all sides	Clear timetable for redeployment as long as criteria, agreed upon by all parties, are met
Integration into broader regional security framework	Commitment from the United States to re-examine elements of the security system if fundamental security situation changes	A clear mechanism for resolving disagreements and ensuring redeployment process does not drag on indefinitely
Long-term American commitment to the security of both states and their neighbors	Refocusing of the Israeli military on its core military, defense, and combat missions	

01 SECTION

Overview



CHAPTER 1

Political and Security Context

This chapter briefly describes the existing Israeli-Palestinian security situation. It then outlines key common threats that any security system would have to address, as well as Israeli security requirements and Palestinian requirements for security, dignity, and sovereignty that must be met for any security system to meet both sides' needs. Finally, it summarizes the greatest challenges and sticking points to getting the two parties to agree on a security system.

Political and Security Context

Confidence in the possibility of solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at a nadir. More than 20 years after Oslo, both sides are deeply disillusioned and trust is nonexistent, especially among Israeli and Palestinian leaders but also among their people. Palestinians have lost any faith in Israel's willingness to withdraw from the West Bank and allow Palestinians to create their own state.⁷ This lack of hope for a political solution, coupled with harsh day-to-day socio-economic conditions, has led to several rounds of violence, including the latest "lone wolf" attacks perpetrated by Palestinian teens and young adults outside the control of the Palestinian Authority.⁸ Since the second intifada, the Israeli public has responded to each round with increasing disillusionment. Even left-wing Israeli politicians, typically staunch supporters of the peace process, have given up on negotiations in the near future and begun to emphasize unilateral steps to separate from the Palestinians.⁹

The regional upheaval of the past few years, including the challenges in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen as well as instability in Egypt's Sinai and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has increased Israeli reluctance to make strategic decisions at a time of uncertainty and skepticism that the two-state solution could meet Israel's security requirements.¹⁰ This dynamic comes on the heels of unilateral Israeli withdrawals from Gaza and Southern Lebanon that led to Hamas and Hezbollah respectively seizing control of these territories and using them as bases for rocket launches against Israel.

Concurrently, the United States, which has played the traditional role of mediator in the conflict, is deeply frustrated, having invested time, energy, and political capital with little if anything to show for it. And with all of the other challenges facing the Middle East, never has the Israeli-Palestinian issue been so low on the agenda in Washington.

Nevertheless, there are some important bright spots that should not be overlooked. Over the past few years there has been significant improvement and professionalization of the Palestinian security forces.¹¹ In spite of high social tension and strong opposition, the PASF has remained professional and persistent in its security mission. With continued training and support, and under conditions of hope associated with a negotiated solution, the PASF can be expected to play a crucial role in ensuring the security of the future state of Palestine and contribute to Israel's security in the process. The leaders of these forces have built strong relations with leaders of their counterpart Israeli security services, and the close cooperation between the two has been a key feature of improved security for both Israelis and Palestinians.¹²

Another important development has been the quietly improving security relationship between Israel and several Arab states. This convergence has been driven primarily by common interests in countering Iran and dealing with the new wave of instability wracking the region.¹³ These common interests reinforce the potential of the Arab Peace Initiative, which offers Israel normalization of relations with the Arab world in exchange for a final status agreement.¹⁴ A central issue to consider is how to convert this potential opportunity into action, and take advantage of improving relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors to improve the environment for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, starting with the foundational area of security.

Israel has also been able to increase its defensive capacity in recent years. Israel has brought online the Iron Dome rocket defense system and is near completion of the Arrow 3 and David's Sling missile defense systems.¹⁵ Iron Dome performed superbly in the recent Gaza conflicts, significantly reducing the threat to Israel.¹⁶ Israel is also investing significant new resources into anti-tunneling technology and recently indicated that the United States has invested \$120 million into this effort, which seems already to be yielding some success.¹⁷ Moreover, despite the chaos and upheaval that have taken place in Syria, Israel has successfully contained any spillover. This is a noteworthy achievement of the Israeli security forces that should not be overlooked. From a conventional threat perspective, Israel is stronger vis-à-vis its neighbors than it has ever been.

Common Threats Facing a Security System

Before designing a security system and offering recommendations, it is important to understand first the major common threats the system would be designed to address. There are three types: (1) internal threats from inside the new Palestinian state; (2) threats around the borders; and (3) threats emanating from the broader region.

INTERNAL THREATS

Any system must be capable of preventing the overthrow of a legitimate Palestinian government by force. There cannot be a repeat of Gaza, where Hamas violently seized control of the state. Likewise, the security system must address the possibility of terrorist attacks by spoilers or opponents of an agreement. These attacks would most likely be directed against Israel and could include bombings, rocket attacks, or infiltration via tunnel. These threats are the ones most feared by the Israeli public, but it should be noted that they could also be used against Palestinians.



Israel's Iron Dome anti-missile defense system has a proven track record of success in countering rockets fired by organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This Iron Dome launcher was deployed in November 2012 and is a core component of the security structure detailed in this report. (Israel Defense Forces/Flickr)

THREATS FROM BORDER AREAS

This includes the border between Jordan and Palestine and between Egypt and Palestine. This threat includes infiltration of terrorists, weapons, or contraband of any sort that could be used to attack either Palestine or Israel. This would also include the use of aircraft for terrorist attacks, and it includes the use of watercraft for smuggling or conducting attacks.

REGIONAL INSTABILITY

The most notable threat would be an attempt by ISIS or other extremist groups to infiltrate Jordan and attempt to destabilize that kingdom from within. This could threaten not only Jordan, but also the future Palestinian state or Israel. The other possibility is a major conventional threat from the east, traditionally conceived of as an Iraqi invasion of Jordan and a march westward. This threat is much less likely since the fall of Saddam Hussein, but it should still be addressed as part of a security system that protects both Israelis and Palestinians.

Israeli Security Requirements

Designing a security system for the two-state solution acceptable to the Israeli public and leadership requires overcoming a number of major challenges, many of which have become even more difficult in the past 15 years. First, there is the experience of the IDF withdrawals from Southern Lebanon in 2000 and, most importantly, Gaza in 2005.¹⁸ Though the Israeli public is far from monolithic in its views, many Israelis consider the unilateral pullout from Gaza a strategic mistake.¹⁹

They see that it was very quickly followed by the collapse of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the seizure of the territory by Hamas. Loose border security between Egypt and Gaza meant that weapons were being smuggled into Gaza and rockets soon began raining down on Israeli citizens. Several major military conflicts later, a substantial portion of the Israeli public is deeply skeptical about any further withdrawals.²⁰ Many Israelis see the same results in Southern Lebanon, where after the Israeli pullout, Hezbollah seized control and spent years arming itself and threatening Israel, eventually leading to a war in 2006 and continued conflict and threats from Israel's north.²¹ The result is that more Israelis are now demanding a long, drawn-out redeployment process, if they condone redeployment at all. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's argument for a 40-year Israeli presence in the Jordan River Valley has increased in popularity and a majority of his coalition in the Knesset opposes any redeployment from the West Bank.

Proponents of future withdrawals will argue that part of the reason Gaza and Southern Lebanon failed is that those withdrawals were unilateral, and particularly in the case of Gaza, were not coordinated with the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, a case can be made that the costs to Israel and to the IDF of the past 15 years of conflict are less than the costs of occupation would have been, but that is not a verifiable proposition. The bottom line is that any security proposal for the two-state solution would need to convince a very skeptical Israeli public that it would not be a repeat of the Gaza withdrawal and that the West Bank would not become a haven for launching attacks on Israel.²²



In an ISIS Sinai Province propaganda picture, an ISIS fighter stands on a burned out Egyptian military vehicle holding the black flag of ISIS with the taunt, "We are coming, oh Jews!" (Wilaya Sina/ISIS Sinai Province)

Beyond the challenge posed by the previous failed withdrawals, any security proposal will also have to deal with Israeli insistence that Israel must be able to “defend itself by itself.”²³ Given Israel’s long struggle with terrorism and its history of wars with its neighbors, this belief is deeply held by the IDF and Israeli society.²⁴ This means that handing over responsibility for security to any external party conflicts with some of the very basic principles of the state of Israel.

While there is some appreciation in Israel for the close and successful security coordination with Jordan, Egypt, and the PASF, which has proved effective in countering joint threats, at the end of the day Israelis will never be willing to fully entrust key elements of their security to their Arab neighbors. Any effort by the United Nations, Europe, or even NATO to help provide security is also likely to be rejected by an Israeli public that has had negative experiences with international forces. And Israel’s isolation and often unfair treatment in international institutions only reinforce this point. The United States – Israel’s closest ally – has a long history of a deep security commitment to Israel. But while Israelis have a much deeper trust in the United States than in any other partner, persuading Israelis to entrust part of their security to the United States will be one of the most challenging hurdles to an agreement.

Finally, Israelis also have little trust for Palestinians when it comes to the question of security. Despite strong cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security forces and significant improvements in PASF capabilities, many Israelis consistently express skepticism about Palestinian will. They argue that even if Palestinian capabilities were upgraded to a point at which the IDF could redeploy, the Palestinians may still not have the political will to follow through and arrest or jail dangerous extremists, especially those with connections to influential Palestinian families.²⁵ Recent American failures – most notably in Iraq, where the United States

Any security proposal will also have to deal with Israeli insistence that Israel must be able to ‘defend itself by itself.’

spent years and billions of dollars training the Iraqi security forces only to see them collapse – reinforce the Israeli argument. The story of the collapse of Iraqi security forces contains critical lessons for enduring PASF performance and involves much more than a lack



In a Hezbollah propaganda video commemorating the July 2006 war, Hezbollah fighters pray before a battle with the IDF in southern Lebanon. The group is likely to remain a persistent security threat to Israel. (Safeeralhussain/YouTube)

of will to fight. Because of poor political leadership in Baghdad, the front-line Iraqi troop formations facing ISIS were grossly understaffed, were literally abandoned by their military leaders, and were not resupplied with ammunition or even food; in addition, the troops’ ongoing training, crucial for performance, was completely neglected. The lessons for PASF performance are clear: the PASF will need functional political governance and a long-term commitment and continuous presence of U.S. trainers, mentors, and monitors.

Palestinian Requirements for Security, Dignity, and Sovereignty

Palestinians have a number of concerns that are crucial for designing an effective and acceptable security system.²⁶ First, after decades of living under occupation, Palestinians care deeply about dignity and sovereignty. They will not accept any solution that includes a visible Israeli force or one that continues to limit Palestinian mobility or conducts functions that they believe should be conducted by the sovereign state of Palestine. Obviously, this is important throughout Palestine, but especially in highly visible locations such as the official border crossings between Palestine and Jordan or Egypt. It is also highly relevant that Palestinians be able to police themselves and move freely around the West Bank.²⁷ While Palestinians realize that an Israeli redeployment would be phased, they insist that in any final agreement those phases would not be prolonged and the redeployment by the IDF would be from all of the territories that make up the future state of Palestine. This impulse directly contradicts Israeli caution in the aftermath of the withdrawal from Gaza.

Palestinians have also been deeply disillusioned by the incrementalism of the Oslo process over the past 20 years. They have little confidence in “confidence-building” measures, instead viewing them as opportunities for the Israelis to simply stretch out the occupation. This creates a significant challenge, as any final redeployment will need to be phased and incremental but will also have to include enough assurances and significant steps upfront to overcome Palestinian skepticism that Israel intends to complete the process.

Finally, while Israelis do not trust Palestinian political will, Palestinians believe that Israelis will overstep at every opportunity. Palestinians believe that Israelis use security as an excuse for occupation, use too much force when conducting operations, and err on the side of arresting or harming people far more than is necessary. The PASF especially chafes when the IDF conducts unilateral operations in Area A of the West Bank, which is supposed to be under Palestinian Authority civil and security control. In those instances, the IDF forces the PASF to leave the area and enters with overwhelming force (because of force protection requirements), thus alienating the local population. This is particularly humiliating for the PASF, which is branded as a collaborator of the occupation because it is publicly shown to not be able to protect its own population from outside incursion.²⁸

Ultimately, this frustration and distrust mean that Palestinians have little faith in Israel to restrain itself if it operates on its own and would have no tolerance for Israel taking independent action in the context of a

two-state solution. This runs contrary to the Israeli desire to be able to act independently and defend itself unilaterally in any outcome.

Beyond questions of sovereignty, Palestinians also care deeply about their own security, and any security framework must be able to also meet Palestinian security needs. At the most basic level they desire effective law and order necessary to allow their society to thrive economically and socially. From that perspective, the improvement of the PASF over the past 10 years has meant less crime and more security, an improvement welcomed by the Palestinian public. Palestinians are frustrated that there are many areas where their security forces are not allowed to go because of restrictions placed on them, including parts of Areas B and C in the West Bank. These lawless areas have also been primary sources of the lone-wolf stabbing attackers. Any final agreement will need to ensure that the PASF has the freedom of movement and capacity to address these problems.

Palestinian officials also envision a role for themselves in a regional security architecture. Palestinians insist that in any two-state agreement, they will not present a security threat to Israel and have accepted that Palestine will be a non-militarized state. They will not enter treaties with any party hostile to Israel or be part of any arms race. Given their close relationships with the Israelis, in the context of a two-state agreement, the Palestinians offer to play a bridging role between Israel and many of the other Arab states and security forces. They also share a common interest in combating the threat posed by al Qaeda, ISIS, or other extremist jihadi groups. And while the Palestinian role in any such effort would be relatively small, Palestinians are eager to play it and do their part in addressing this common threat.

Most Difficult Sticking Points

The challenges, fears, and distrust on both sides described above make designing any security system that is compatible with both sides’ requirements exceedingly difficult. Specifically, they lead to four sensitive areas where balancing Israeli needs for security and Palestinian needs for sovereignty become most difficult:

- Timetables for the redeployment of Israeli forces.
- Residual IDF forces on the Jordan River.
- The question of who makes the final decisions on Israeli redeployment.
- Israeli right to re-entry in the event of an emergency.

These sticking points will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 2.



Israel Defense Force soldiers patrol a Palestinian area of the contested city of Hebron. This report recommends that Palestinian National Security Forces (PASF) be the primary security force in a future Palestinian state. Israel would maintain the right to intervene unilaterally against imminent security threats that are not being addressed by the PASF. (Justin McIntosh/Wikimedia)



CHAPTER 2

Organizing Principles of the Security System

Given the challenges presented in the previous chapter, it is extraordinarily difficult – but not impossible – to develop a security system that meets both sides' needs. This chapter outlines the basic framework of the security system. It starts by summarizing some key assumptions about what a final peace agreement would entail. It then describes the key principles associated with such a system and the transition process that would be required to move safely from the status quo to the system at end state. Finally, this chapter addresses the most difficult sticking points between the parties when it comes to the question of security.

Assumptions

First, we assume for the purposes of this study that the majority of this security system would be completed after all final status issues have been decided through negotiation and a peace agreement is signed. Many of the measures in the proposed security framework explicitly call for the type of cooperation and coordination that would only be possible in the context of an agreement. That said, even before reaching such an agreement, the two sides could and should implement certain elements in this system, as enumerated in Chapter 8.²⁹

We also assume, as many have in the past, that in the context of a final status agreement, Israel will make concessions to the Palestinians on questions of territory and that the final Palestinian state will be based on the 1967 lines with reciprocal swaps. In exchange, as long as their redlines on sovereignty are not violated, Palestinian negotiators will be more flexible on meeting core Israeli security requirements. This approach is consistent with the Clinton Parameters and almost every other previous final status proposal that has been tabled.³⁰

We assume that by the time this security architecture end state is in place (several years after the agreement is reached), all associated land swaps will have been completed, the existing separation barrier will have been adjusted to the final borders, and the remainder of the separation barrier between Palestine and Israel will be in place.

This study assumes that the permanent status agreement will only be implemented in Gaza once there is a unified Palestinian regime with a unified security establishment answering to one central government that meets the three conditions set by the Middle East Quartet: (1) recognize Israel; (2) renounce violence; and (3) agree to endorse already-signed agreements. And as part of the reintegration of Gaza and the West Bank, the government in Gaza would have to agree to dismantle Gaza's military industry, rocket systems, and offensive military capabilities. Developing a process for reintegrating Gaza and the West Bank under one leadership is beyond the scope of this study. Absent this prerequisite, implementation of an agreement may take place first in the West Bank. This security plan has a specific outline for the security arrangements that are needed in Gaza, regardless of the timing of Gaza's transition back to Palestinian Authority control.

We also assume that Israel will maintain (or increase) its existing capabilities to defend itself. The components of this security architecture in some cases draw from existing Israeli capabilities, but in most cases are enhancements. In other words, Israel's current security

apparatus will not be replaced, but rather augmented, making a viable two-state arrangement possible while improving quality of life for both Israelis and Palestinians. This gives Israelis the assurance that even in a worst-case scenario of a complete collapse of an agreement between Israel and Palestine, Israel will still be able to defend itself by itself.

The study takes as its starting point Palestinian governance and security capacity that exist today and then focuses primarily on recommendations for improving Palestinian security systems. However, there is an implicit assumption that the international community will continue to assist Palestine in improving its governance capacity over time.³¹ Donor fatigue has been rising over the last decade because of the lack of a political horizon for resolving the conflict. However, if the parties were able to reach a permanent status agreement, donors and investors would be significantly reinvigorated. Investments in governance take longer to show results, but in the long run, security institutions suffer greatly if governance does not keep up. While the study generally assumes that in the context of a final agreement, Palestinian governance will continue to slowly improve, it also leaves in place mechanisms for reconsideration in the event there are major unforeseen negative developments on this front.

Finally, the study makes few assumptions about the overall regional context. Its starting point is that the Middle East will remain in a difficult and unstable situation for years. A permanent status agreement will not solve issues such as Islamic extremism, regional instability, and poor governance. But even though



Fighters from the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, march in a parade in Gaza City in December 2014. Overcoming the Hamas challenge will be a core objective of a sustainable security architecture to support the two-state solution. (Al-Wataniyya News Agency/YouTube)

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the source of most of the major challenges facing the region, ending the conflict could certainly have positive consequences for the Middle East. This study therefore makes suggestions about ways the agreement could be leveraged to improve overall regional security as well as security for Israelis and Palestinians. It also leaves in place mechanisms to review or reconsider certain elements in the event of unforeseen dramatic negative changes stemming from regional instability.

Key Principles of a Security System

The security system described in this paper addresses the key needs of all sides. It includes a multilayered system that builds up Palestinian capacity to provide law and order and counter terrorism while minimizing Israeli interference in Palestinian sovereignty. However, it does not foreclose Israel's ability to act unilaterally in self-defense if it feels it must. It gives the Palestinians a clear timeline, but one that is dependent on conditions and criteria agreed to with the Israelis. It includes a long-term monitoring process so that Israelis maintain clear awareness of what is going on in the West Bank and avoid surprises, but that process is unintrusive and involves joint Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. And it provides an Israel-U.S. consultative process to deal with fundamental strategic surprises that could arise from regional instability. The proposed security system is based on the following central principles, which address both Israeli and Palestinian needs.

Build a multilayered system that addresses Israel's security concerns in which Israel retains the right of self defense as well as the capacity to defend itself by itself, but ensures this is only necessary in extremis. In the event of an agreement that includes normalization with the Arab world, Israeli security, especially with regard to counterterrorism, has the potential to expand far outside its borders.

The first layer should be joint intelligence cooperation, countersmuggling, and counterterrorism operations with moderate Arab states, including not only Jordan and Egypt but also the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the other GCC states that have strong intelligence services and common interests with Israel in countering Iran and rolling back extremism.

A second layer would be close coordinated efforts with Egypt and Jordan, with whom Israel already has tight security coordination. This would be dramatically expanded, for example, with Jordan by establishing a common border security system and joint operating centers that would give Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians complete visibility of the border.

A third layer would be a comprehensive border security system far superior to today's border fence; the new system would include redundant physical barriers, motion sensors, long-range aerostat-borne sensors, tunneling detection systems, and border control centers. While technological solutions cannot fully address the deep concerns that both sides have, such advancements do have the potential to improve security for all and make it much easier for both Palestinians and Israelis to agree on steps that are mutually beneficial.

A fourth layer would be roving patrols on the patrol roads that include a small American force along the border between Palestine and Jordan. The composition of the patrols would change over the transition.

A fifth layer would be effectively trained Palestinian security forces throughout the new Palestinian state that would ensure internal security.

Like any other sovereign state, Israel would retain the ability to respond in extreme circumstances where it deemed it necessary to defend itself.

These five external layers provide Israel great strategic depth. Inside the five external layers are Israeli forces in Israel with all their current capabilities to engage and neutralize threats. These forces would be able to defend their own new borders that are agreed to with the Palestinians. Like any other sovereign state, Israel would retain the ability to respond in extreme circumstances where it deemed it necessary to defend itself, even if it meant violating the sovereignty of another state. But, just as for any other sovereign state, taking such actions would come with political risks and other consequences that would need to be weighed by Israel's leadership. To mitigate some of those risks, there could be a side agreement between the United States and Israel on the general circumstances under which the United States would diplomatically side with Israel in the event Israel took unilateral action inside Palestine.

Overall, this basic approach would be tailored differently for each domain (ground, air, sea), but the basic concept includes enough redundant checks in the system so that intrusion on Palestinian sovereignty during transition would be minimal while still giving Israel the ability to defend itself in extremis.



Members of Yamam, the Israeli Border Police Force's elite counter-terrorism unit widely recognized as one of the most professional and effective counter-terrorism police units in the world, listen to Yohanan Donino, the former Chief Commissioner of the Israeli Police Force. (Israeli Police/Wikimedia)

Minimize Israeli visibility to Palestinian civilians and pursue significant early steps that signal a fundamental change on the ground to Palestinians.

Palestinian concerns revolve primarily around violations of their sovereignty and dignity. Many of the most visible concerns can be quickly addressed. For example, almost immediately, Israel can reclassify a significant portion of West Bank Area C, particularly in the north, as Area A and redeploy from that location. It can stop routine incursions into Palestinian populated areas. It can move relatively rapidly to reduce its visibility on the border crossings between Jordan and the West Bank, especially if it begins making preparations early and coordinating with Palestinians, Jordanians, and Americans to build the necessary facilities well in advance of agreed redeployment.

Where Israel does maintain a presence during the initial transitional phases, there are many locations where it can look to reduce its footprint. Even along the highly contested Jordan River, Israeli forces can move to a 2-kilometer stretch east of Route 90 during the transitional phase where they are not visible to Palestinians. The basic philosophy must be to eliminate the everyday feeling of occupation as quickly as possible, primarily by reducing the visible presence of the IDF and reducing barriers to movement and access around the West Bank. This will make Palestinians much more understanding when it comes to accommodating Israel's genuine and legitimate security concerns and tolerating a phased redeployment on a longer timetable.

Plan a conditions-dependent, area-by-area redeployment with target timetables and an effective remediation process. Palestinians are concerned that a conditions-dependent redeployment will lead the Israelis to renege on their commitments and never withdraw. Israelis worry that a premature redeployment would lead to unacceptable security risks and therefore want a veto. To address these competing concerns, the parties would agree on a conditions-dependent redeployment with agreed target timetables. A security implementation verification group consisting of Israeli, Palestinian, and American security professionals would be established to plan and implement the area-by-area redeployment over time. This will be described in detail in Chapter 7.

Conduct significant upgrades to security systems and infrastructure. The upgrades would include border control centers, joint operations centers, upgraded crossing-point facilities with biometrics capabilities, improved border trace security systems, motion sensors, tunnel detection systems, aerostats, counterterrorism system facilities, airport and air traffic control facilities, maritime port and associated facilities, electromagnetic spectrum management equipment, and SIVG facilities and equipment.

Build joint operations centers and data sharing mechanisms so there is maximum situational awareness of the security situation for Israelis but minimal intrusion on Palestinian sovereignty. In numerous instances, joint operations centers and data sharing

can play valuable roles. For example, joint operations centers manned by Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians, and Americans would give full visibility of the Palestinian border with Jordan. This visibility would also be available to all parties in their own higher headquarters or operations centers. Other examples would include real-time joint information sharing on biometric data and visa information from the crossing points to ensure there is complete tracking of who is entering and leaving the Palestinian state.

There would also be a joint counterterrorism center to share intelligence and plan operations that would be executed by Palestinian security forces but with support from Israeli and regional intelligence.

The basic purpose is to give the Israelis as much situational awareness and influence as possible but without actual physical intrusion that would visibly impinge on Palestinian sovereignty. American monitors would play a key role in helping implement these arrangements and could also be a useful mediator or arbiter in the event of disagreements. But these structures should be designed to avoid situations in which the United States is inserted directly into the process, as historically this practice has harmed cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.

Employ American forces for training, equipping, evaluating, and monitoring and for highly limited operations. In addition to the SIVG roles of planning, training, equipping, evaluating and monitoring, this force should also take on two unique but limited operational roles: (1) assisting in border security with the PASF on the border between Jordan and Palestine and (2) playing

a facilitating role in the event there are disagreements between Israelis and Palestinians about intelligence or the need for a particular operation. Given Israeli distrust of international forces, the only possibly acceptable international force that could take on these roles would be the United States. The force would likely include a total of a few hundred Americans.

Addressing the Toughest Sticking Points

As introduced in Chapter 1, there are four difficult issues that have consistently been the sticking points for any agreement: timetables for the redeployment of Israeli forces, residual forces on the Jordan River, decisions on final redeployment, and Israeli right to re-entry. In some cases, we make a recommendation on one specific approach to address a problem. In others, we lay out a series of options that negotiators will have to draw on when trying to come to an agreement. None are ideal, and all will cause both parties to make difficult decisions.

TIMETABLE FOR REDEPLOYMENT

The security elements of the agreements can be most clearly explained and judged by the public on the basis of redeployment timelines. In the most recent failed draft U.N. Security Council resolution, at the end of 2014, Palestinians pressed for a two-year redeployment time frame though they had previously indicated a willingness to go for five years. Meanwhile, Netanyahu has argued for a 40-year Israeli presence in the Jordan River Valley though previous Israeli governments have been more flexible.

The two sides will have to agree on target timelines even if area-by-area transfer of authority (TOA) and redeployment are ultimately conditions-dependent. A 10- to 15-year time frame is probably on the outer edge of what Palestinians might accept and would be on the lower end of the range of what might work for Israelis. It would require a phased approach in which Israel front-loads some initial early steps that dramatically reduce visibility in exchange for a prolonged process in areas where security concerns are more acute and less visible. But it is also important to note that under any agreement, Israel would have to relocate thousands of settlers out of the West Bank, which would take years. The IDF will not leave Israeli citizens in a vulnerable security situation. Therefore, until those settlers are relocated, the IDF will remain in place in those areas and will retain responsibility for the overall security in the West Bank even as large areas are transitioned to Palestinian responsibility.

One possibility would involve a “5-5-5” phased model over 15 years. The first five years would involve



A persistent observation system (aerostat), equipped with high-resolution cameras and high quality live-streaming video monitors, is prepped for deployment at a U.S. forward operating base in Afghanistan in December 2010. Aerostat systems would be a component of the border security system between Jordan and a future Palestinian state. (Chief Petty Officer Matthew J. Thomas/U.S. Navy)

evacuation of the settlements that will not be part of the land swaps, completion of the security barrier, and PASF capacity-building. During this time, Israel would begin to hand over more security responsibilities to the PASF as Israel completed settlement evacuation in a particular area and as the PASF met specific training criteria. However, overall responsibility for security during those first five years would remain with Israel. In the second five years, called the “stabilization phase,” most of the West Bank would undergo transfer of security authority from the IDF to the PASF, but IDF would remain in the Jordan Valley. In the final five years, the IDF would transition out of the Jordan Valley and, at the very end, off the Jordan River. There are numerous iterations that would also include transitional phases in which the United States might temporarily or permanently take responsibility for specific functions such as patrolling the Jordan River.

Another option would be for a set time frame agreed to by Israelis and Palestinians with an option for extension, based on either American judgment or Palestinian request derived, for example, from a perceived external threat that its forces may not be able to meet. For example, the Palestinians could agree to 10 years but with an ability to extend the Israeli presence yearly beyond that for certain cooperative ventures. After 10 years, with the majority of Israeli forces out and the remainder in a low visibility mode, it would be much easier to quietly extend the time frame as a technical request at the security level. The Palestinians as part of the initial agreement could quietly offer the United States a promise that they would extend for a minimum additional number of years beyond the initial 10, and the United States could then make that commitment to Israel in the form of a presidential letter or side agreement. Of course, this might still be very difficult for Israelis to accept, as it would require trusting their Palestinian negotiating partners. And it may be very tough for the Palestinians to offer, given that no Palestinian leader or security official would want to acknowledge such a request for extension publicly.

FORCES ON THE JORDAN RIVER

Despite all of the upgrades to the border security system described in Chapter 4 of this paper, Israelis still feel very strongly about the need for an Israeli force on the Jordan River. They fear instability in Jordan, especially in today’s difficult regional environment, and insist on the ability to defend themselves by themselves. They also worry that Palestinian forces will be inadequate for stopping conventional threats as well as smuggling and infiltration along the border.³² Palestinians are willing to accept a third-party force. Limiting any force to only a narrow corridor east of Route

90 certainly addresses Palestinian concerns about a visible presence, but for sovereignty, they still insist on a final Israeli withdrawal from this area. There are a number of options for addressing this challenge, all of which would be compatible with the proposed security system. They are outlined below.

We judge that the most realistic option on the Palestinian side of the border is a permanent American force, numbering in the low hundreds. This force could jointly patrol the border with Palestinian security forces or simply do so on its own, but the most important element is that overall security responsibility in this area would fall to the United States. Given the strength and history of the U.S.-Israel alliance, this provides the Israelis with the greatest reassurance possible short of an Israeli force on the river while still not forcing the Palestinians to live with an Israeli force on their sovereign territory. Israelis are worried about any third-party force – even an American one – and will balk at this idea. They worry about losing freedom of action and about changing the nature of the U.S.-Israeli relationship if American casualties were taken on behalf of Israel.³³ They are also concerned that an American force could become a magnet for extremist attacks. But given the strength of the U.S.-Israel relationship, these concerns can be overcome. There is also a question about whether such a proposal would be sellable to the American public and the U.S. Congress. But as demonstrated by long-standing U.S. deployments such as to the Balkans (since the mid-1990s) and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai (since the late 1970s), the American public is willing to support small deployments that make a large impact, particularly in defense of Israel or in support of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.³⁴

Another recent concern has been the potential of the MFO to redeploy from parts of the Sinai and the claim that this is an indicator that a U.S. force cannot be trusted. But the MFO was never tasked with or designed to deal with a counterterrorism mission and was instead equipped to monitor the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, which it has done successfully for 35 years. This border force would have a different mission beyond simply monitoring and would be responsible for securing the border, including dealing with any terrorist threat on that border. It would therefore be equipped and trained to handle such situations.

Another option for forces on the border would be a small and permanent Israeli presence in a special security zone, 2 kilometers wide, along the west side of the Jordan River. The presence would have to be



A pole in the middle of the Jordan River indicates the current boundary between Israel and Jordan. The river would be the future boundary of a Palestinian state with Jordan and the site of an extensive security layer providing constant situational awareness of threats for Palestinian, Jordanian, and Israeli authorities. (Peter לוינש/Wikimedia)

invisible to the average Palestinian, which could be done by keeping Israelis east of Route 90. Such a concession by the Palestinians would have to include a tradeoff. For example, in exchange for an Israeli presence on this territory, Palestinians could get access to a Mediterranean port facility inside Israel with significant economic benefits. While this outcome would be ideal for Israelis, it would be very difficult for Palestinians to accept.

Another option would be joint Israeli-Palestinian patrols along the river. This would be more in line with Palestinian sovereignty and would also be in the broader spirit of encouraging information sharing and collaboration among Palestinians and Israelis. There is also an option to add other players to such an arrangement, including the United States, the Jordanians, or an international force. The challenge is that during the second intifada, joint patrols resulted in clashes between Israelis and Palestinians, which has led both sides to be skeptical of this approach.³⁵ But one could also argue that today's PASF is much more capable than those in 2000 and security coordination is stronger today than it was then, partially obviating this concern.

Another possibility is having an American patrol force on the Jordanian side of the river and giving the Palestinians responsibility on their side. This would give the Israelis the reassurance of a U.S. force but still leave them greater freedom of action on the Palestinian side of the river if Israel decided to intervene unilaterally but feared an inadvertent incident with American forces. It is an open question whether Jordan would ever be willing to accept U.S. forces on its territory for this

purpose, given the intrusion on its sovereignty. However, there are already U.S. forces deployed in Jordan as part of a mission to counter ISIS and help Jordan protect its borders with Syria and Iraq, so this could be framed as a greater U.S. security commitment to Jordan.

The United States could lead an international or NATO force in holding the Jordan River. Such an approach would be an easier sell politically in the United States, as it would not be seen as purely a U.S. commitment but an international one. But after the experience with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in Southern Lebanon and the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Gaza, Israelis are highly skeptical, to put it mildly, that international forces would actually stay and fight in the event of an emergency.³⁶ Even if such a force were U.S.-led, it would likely be met with intense Israeli skepticism.

A final option would be a hybrid approach that would start with an Israeli presence and then transition over time to an American presence or some joint-forces option that includes Israelis, ending eventually after a prolonged period with an exclusively Palestinian force.

FINAL DECISIONS ON REDEPLOYMENT

Given their strong belief in defending themselves by themselves, many Israelis believe that any final agreement on withdrawal should include a consensus decision of the parties, which would essentially give the Israelis a veto. Palestinian negotiators, who have a bitter experience with the incrementalism of the Oslo process, absolutely refuse an Israeli decision over the final redeployment of forces.

The SIVG is designed to address this issue by creating a process that keeps the PASF evaluation decisions as objective as possible by basing them on criteria that Israeli, Palestinian, and American security professionals develop and agree upon in advance. It also provides a number of remediation and appeal options, as detailed in Chapter 7. There are specific time limitations on remediation in order to avoid it becoming endless.

If the parties do not agree on whether Palestinian performance meets the established criteria in a given area, even after remediation, then the only real option is to push the decision up beyond the SIVG to a political track. This would start with a special envoy for implementation on the American side and the primary negotiators/implementers on the Israeli and Palestinian sides. It could then be moved up to higher levels if necessary. The benefit is that it will likely take political leadership to break the impasse, especially in a situation where a final status agreement has been struck and all sides are

politically motivated to not have it fall apart. On the other hand, in recent years security channels between Israelis and Palestinians have functioned much more effectively than political channels. So from that perspective, pushing this upward to political decisionmakers might make a situation more contentious instead of less. Unfortunately, given that at this point a disagreement would inevitably have political overtones, it probably would only be solved be at the political level.

Another mechanism may be to seek a physical solution or upgrade that can solve the specific problem and that works for all the parties; such a solution could potentially be implemented as part of remediation (e.g., installing a new physical barrier in a particular sector, rerouting a road, or providing some other technological upgrade or improvement that could break the impasse).

Another factor that could come into play is Israeli refusal to redeploy because of broader concerns about shifting regional dynamics or internal governance dynamics inside Palestine. The Palestinians will never agree to such uncertain and variable criteria being part of the metrics for Israeli redeployment. But the United States and Israel can agree on a mechanism for their own internal reviews of such factors. This could include a regularly scheduled consultation (perhaps annually or every six months) to examine these types of factors and how they are impacting the overall transition process. There could also be a process for triggering an emergency consultation in the event of a crisis. If major unforeseen problems arise, this U.S.-Israel dialogue could yield additional American security enhancements and commitments to try to overcome new security challenges, or in extreme circumstances the United States would go back to the Palestinians and look for ways to amend implementation to meet these new concerns.

ISRAELI RE-ENTRY

The layered security system and joint data sharing and operations, along with an American force, are all designed to limit the need for a direct Israeli intervention in Palestine. However, Israelis will still insist that if necessary, they should be able to act unilaterally to defend themselves. Palestinians will object strongly to any violation of their sovereignty and fear that the Israelis will regularly overstep. It is important to clarify the distinctions between two very different threat scenarios: a major direct conventional threat (such as a conventional force invading Jordan and threatening the border of Palestine), as opposed to the much more likely scenario of a disagreement between Israelis and Palestinians on a specific counterterrorism operation

(and whether a specific individual should be arrested). In the case of a conventional threat, it is quite likely that the Palestinian government would want the IDF to help protect Palestine from an outside invader. In the latter case, involving an internal challenge, the United States could play a moderating role between the two sides at the operational level through the SIVG's intelligence arm.

It will be very difficult to acknowledge any of these challenges inside the final agreement. No Palestinian leader would ever be likely to sign a document that would make such a major concession on Palestinian sovereignty. In the aftermath of a deal, Israel will still be a sovereign state that can take things into its own hands if it wants to, even if that means violating Palestinian territorial sovereignty. Indeed, appropriately or not, states violate each other's sovereignty all the time. The United States chose to unilaterally take out Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.³⁷ Turkey has recently conducted incursions into Iraq to go after the Kurdistan Workers' Party.³⁸ And indeed, Israel has regularly acted unilaterally in Syria and Lebanon to prevent the transfer of high-end weapons to Hezbollah.³⁹ States do what they have to do to defend themselves if they believe it is in their interest and they are willing to incur the risks, and this situation is no different. But such an approach is risky in that the first time Israel takes such action, it could cause a major crisis in the agreement, especially if there are no mechanisms to mediate such a crisis.

An option to address this dilemma is a side agreement on the general conditions under which the United States would diplomatically support Israeli action inside the future Palestinian state. Palestinians would need to be aware of the conditions and not object to them, but no Palestinian leader would have to sign such a document or otherwise be asked to agree to it.

02 SECTION

The Security System at End State



CHAPTER 3

Internal Security

The first layer of security for both Palestinians and Israelis in this proposed system would be the internal security forces of the Palestinian state. This will be vital for Palestinians from a perspective of law and order and for Israelis due to their concerns about counterterrorism. This chapter describes the necessary capacity of the PASF under such a system, specific improvements that need to be made to address counterterrorism challenges, and how Israelis and Palestinians can work jointly to address these threats. The chapter concludes with two potential crisis scenarios, which have been built out to demonstrate how the system might work in the event of emergency.

Palestinian Security Forces

The Palestinian state will be non-militarized and not pose a security threat to Israel. Therefore, the PASF would be a non-militarized security force with maximum capabilities that resemble a gendarmerie model.

The missions of the PASF would be public order, law enforcement, counterterrorism, border security, protection of government officials and foreign dignitaries, and disaster response.

The PASF is currently organized as follows: Palestinian Civil Police, National Security Force, Presidential Guard, Preventive Security Force, Customs and Borders Police, Coastal Police, Civil Defense Force, General Intelligence, and Military Intelligence.⁴⁰ Although it is not uncommon for states to have several security forces, the interagency competition it causes can be counterproductive. The SIVG should conduct a formal assessment to determine whether the current structure best meets Palestinian security needs, but we acknowledge that a Palestinian security structure need not be a mirror image of a Western structure.

The PASF should include a small but highly capable counterterrorism (CT) unit. The unit should be trained and equipped to a level analogous with a Special Weapons and Tactics unit of a large American city, such as Los Angeles or New York. This unit would be part of the Counterterrorism System (CTS) described below.

To maintain the requirements of a demilitarized force, a list of approved weapons and equipment would be developed. In general, it is much easier to manage an “approved list” than a “prohibited list,” but the approved list should be developed with the following guidelines on prohibited items in mind: tanks, rockets, guided missiles, anti-aircraft weapons, anti-ship weapons, artillery systems, mortars, mines, machine guns above 7.62, laser/radiating weapons, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, armed boats above 25 tons or with weapons above 7.62, and any weapons of mass destruction. This is a starting point for detailed negotiations between the parties about the maximum allowable future capabilities of the PASF. Future items requested by the PASF should be discussed and approved through the SIVG, which would also monitor and enforce this element of the agreement.

Much of the training and equipping of the PASF has already been accomplished by the Palestinian Authority Security Forces Training Program conducted by the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) and other international partners. A key element of a two-state agreement between Israelis and Palestinians will be an agreement on the maximum capabilities of the

non-militarized PASF, noting that the PASF will be responsible for all of the West Bank and Gaza (once an intra-Palestinian political settlement is reached), not just the limits of Area A. Once the upper limit of PASF capability is defined, the SIVG should conduct a formal assessment to determine the current capabilities of the PASF. The assessment should cover all aspects of the security forces, including personnel management, pay systems, individual and unit performance in all designated tasks, logistics performance, communication capabilities, mobility, administrative structures, and institutional oversight. The difference between the current capabilities and the agreed future capabilities of the PASF would be the basis for a security capacity-building program conducted and monitored by the SIVG.

Counterterrorism System

One of the most difficult challenges for Palestinian security forces will be internal threats posed by extremists in Palestine who could threaten Israel or the new Palestinian state. Here there are two challenges. The first is attaining Palestinian security force capabilities sufficient to foil plots and capture suspects. The second and larger challenge is to develop a Palestinian justice system that is capable of prosecuting and incarcerating terrorist suspects in a timely and secure manner. Even with substantial outside assistance, it would take years for the overall judicial system to be able to fully perform this function. Therefore, as the Palestinians focus on the long-term effort of state-building, there must be an immediate short-term acceleration and focus on developing a small, temporary, self-contained system of security and legal capabilities necessary to create an effective counterterrorism program.

This full-spectrum, self-contained counterterrorism system would encompass all elements of counterterrorism, from initial detection of illicit activity to longtime incarceration of the perpetrators. Included in the system would be: intelligence officers to detect potential terrorist activity, specially trained CT forces to raid sites and arrest perpetrators, forensics experts to conduct site exploitation, pretrial detention officers to ensure prisoners do not escape, prosecutors and judges to conduct trials and issue warrants, and post-trial detention officers to ensure prisoners are not released early. The system would include stand-alone detention facilities and protected, vetted personnel who would be able to conduct the above activities while being shielded from nefarious outside influence. This system would be the highest priority elements of any training program for the PASF,

should begin immediately, and would require the highest standards before transfer of authority.

Intelligence sharing on potential terrorist threats with Jordan and Egypt would be another key element of this system. Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, and Egyptian security officials would meet regularly to discuss the overall intelligence picture and share information, particularly with regard to potential terrorist threats. There would also be a mechanism to rapidly share information and jointly respond in the event of a focused and specific threat that is detected by one of the security agencies.

Another element of the counterterrorism system would be Israeli-Palestinian joint operations center(s) where Israeli and Palestinian security forces could work together, share intelligence, identify potential targets, and conduct operations. These operations could be orchestrated from one consolidated operations center, or joint centers could be set up near a number of key urban environments from which a terrorism threat is most likely to emerge.

A full-spectrum, self-contained counterterrorism system would encompass all elements of counterterrorism, from initial detection of illicit activity to longtime incarceration of the perpetrators.

The United States would also have an important facilitating role but should not be directly inserted. Historically, an overbearing U.S. role has led to poorer coordination between Israelis and Palestinians, as they tend to default to relying on the Americans to arbitrate any disagreement. Instead, there could be an American liaison officer based out of the headquarters of the SIVG but not on-site at the joint operations center. The officer would have access to all of the same information and would meet with his or her Israeli and Palestinian counterparts on a regular basis to review intelligence and operations.

Operations would be conducted by Palestinian security forces with U.S. support as necessary. To illustrate, here is how the system would work. An intelligence report would be generated by Palestinian, Israeli, Jordanian, Egyptian, or other intelligence services indicating a potential threat inside the West Bank or Gaza. The threat would be passed to the intelligence section of the

counterterrorism operations center, which at least in the first phases of a transition would be jointly staffed by Israelis and Palestinians. After quick review, the Palestinian commander of the operations center would task a Palestinian CT operations unit to commence planning a CT operation. (Over time as the system develops, in the ideal situation the commander would also simultaneously request a warrant from a CTS judge.) The counterterrorism operations center would coordinate as necessary with the PASF but protect against tipping off the suspects. The CT operations unit would conduct the raid and site exploitation. CTS forensics experts would immediately follow to collect evidence for prosecution. The captured suspects would be taken to a CTS-protected jail that would ensure they are not released. CTS-protected prosecutors would present the case to a CTS-protected judge. If convicted, the person or people would be incarcerated long term in a CTS-protected prison. In all of this, the Palestinians would be in the lead in terms of executing the actual operation. American trainers could support the Palestinians with any enablers. And both Israelis and Americans could work with the Palestinians on intelligence exploitation and planning the operation.

There would of course be potential challenges with this system. The first would be Israeli willingness to share intelligence information with Palestinian counterparts for fear of jeopardizing sensitive sources and methods. In most cases such issues can be overcome by scrubbing information about sources and methods from a specific piece of intelligence. But in some instances, the United States can play the mediator role. The American liaison officer to the counterterrorism operations center could review the intelligence and then make a recommendation to the Palestinian security forces on whether the information merits an operation.

Perhaps the bigger challenge is what happens if Palestinians prove unwilling or unable to conduct an operation that Israelis insist is necessary for their security. The first step in resolving the dispute would be elevating it to the leadership level of the SIVG, where a three-star U.S. general and Palestinian and Israeli two-stars could quickly resolve the matter. If such a situation arose, one of the roles of the U.S. liaison officers would be to provide a third party perspective to the American general. If the issue could not be resolved, then it would be quickly elevated to the political level.

At the political level the Israeli prime minister and defense minister would have a number of choices. They could engage with their Palestinian counterparts to convince them to undertake the operation. The Israelis

could also appeal to U.S. leadership – perhaps an American special envoy charged with implementing the deal or the secretary of state – to press the Palestinians to take action. Or, if the Israeli leader deems this an absolute emergency, he or she retains the ability to take unilateral action to address the threat just as any sovereign state retains such a capacity. Of course, the Palestinians would not agree to such actions and every time Israel took such a step, it could come with negative consequences for the overall agreement, but it remains an option.

For these types of situations, as part of the agreement, the United States and Israel would have a side agreement stating that if Israel were under direct and imminent threat, the United States would support Israel diplomatically if it chose to take action. This agreement would leave the Israeli prime minister with another decision. He or she may choose to go to American officials and attempt to attain explicit agreement in advance of an operation to ensure the Americans will back Israel's action. Or Israel could choose to act on its own and seek American support under the side agreement only in the aftermath, but with the risk that the United States would view the situation differently.

Scenario: Discovery of a Rocket Factory in Nablus

The joint intelligence mechanisms that include Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, and Americans identify an emerging rocket factory in Nablus. Israeli and Palestinian intelligence officers and planners at the joint operations center would then create a target folder for the threat that gives options to engage it from the ground with the PASF or from the air with Israeli Air Force (IAF) assets, as well as an assessment of collateral damage potential for each option.

The PASF CT unit would be the expected and preferred option to carry out the operation. The PASF would likely view this rocket factory as a threat to Palestine's own security and would therefore most likely be willing to neutralize this target. Moreover, knowing Israel's likely view of such a situation might further motivate the Palestinians, since they would want to avoid the real possibility that Israel would act if they did not, and that the United States would support such action.

The PASF CT unit would deploy to the objective and neutralize the target, preferably by arrest, but by lethal force if necessary. Forensics experts would immediately follow and sensitive site exploitation would commence to collect further intelligence and evidence to prosecute the terrorists. If hostile personnel were captured alive, they would be detained in the CT system detention facility,

prosecuted by CT system prosecutors, and judged by a CT system judge. Their long-term confinement would be in a CT system long-term detention facility. There would be no “revolving door.”

Just in case, as the operation was being planned by the PASF CT unit, an IDF CT unit would be placed on alert and conduct parallel planning in the event there was disagreement between Israelis and Palestinians on the need to act. If there were a disagreement in this scenario, there would likely be multiple options for resolving it, as a rocket factory presents a slowly developing threat – not an imminent attack. First, the issue would go to the leadership of the SIVG for resolution. If it were not resolved, in this case the Israeli prime minister would likely choose to engage with his or her Palestinian counterpart or with the Americans to quickly settle the issue. Only in the worst-case scenario would an Israeli prime minister have to act unilaterally.

Scenario: Imminent Threat of Terrorist Attack or Rocket Launch

A time-critical threat would be detected by the same multilayered intelligence network described in the first scenario. The major difference between this and the first scenario is the lack of time available for more detailed planning. Intelligence officers and planners would create an immediate-action target folder with options for engagement from the ground and from the air (with IAF assets). The air option would include a rapid analysis of potential collateral damage.

Counter rocket/mortar systems (Iron Dome) would be immediately placed at highest readiness and a flight of Israeli Air Force aircraft with appropriate munitions (small-diameter, precision-guided) would be readied for takeoff. If time allowed for a ground option, then at the same time, the PASF CT unit and an Israeli unit would begin immediate planning for a ground assault. The PASF CT unit would again be the unit of choice. If the PASF CT unit refused to engage the target, or even hesitated to do so, then the IDF CT unit or the airstrike option would be used immediately instead. It is also important to note that in this case many of the diplomatic options available to the Israeli prime minister in the rocket factory scenario would no longer be options. Israel would have to act first and afterward seek support from the United States and engage with the Palestinian leadership to mitigate the potential damage.

The rest of the process, from assault to arrest to site exploitation to short-term detention to prosecution and judgment to long-term detention, would occur within the CT system just as described above.



CHAPTER 4

Border Security

The border security architecture must address a number of separate borders: (1) the future Palestinian state and Jordan; (2) the future Palestinian state and Egypt; and (3) the future Palestinian state (including Gaza and the West Bank) and Israel. This chapter focuses first on the Jordanian and Egyptian borders, with a special focus on the Jordanian border given its sensitivity and the long history of disagreement between Israelis and Palestinians on this issue. The border security architecture is divided into two aspects: the architecture of crossing points and border security along the border trace away from crossing points.

The Jordanian and Egyptian Borders

CROSSING POINTS

Crossing points are important for Palestinian dignity and sovereignty. When crossing between Jordan or Egypt and their future state, Palestinians would not want to see Israeli security personnel at Palestinian crossing points. However, for Israelis, it is a question of whether they trust the PASF to execute the mission and keep out potential threats. Below we describe how a crossing-point system would work between Jordan and the future Palestinian state. A system with many of the same features could also be developed between Egypt and Gaza. After a number of years the arrangements around the crossings could be reviewed and amended by mutual consent of the parties.

Crossing points in the proposed enduring security architecture would be staffed by the PASF (on the Palestinian side) and Jordanian security forces (on the Jordanian side of a crossing) but would also be monitored with a nonvisible presence by the IDF that if technology permits could eventually become remote. During the early years of a transition there would be Israeli presence on-site and Israel would remain responsible for the overall security of the border crossings, but the force visibility would be dramatically lessened, both by reducing numbers and by using nonuniformed personnel. As security transitioned, Israeli forces would move out of view of the public altogether, observing from behind one-way glass or via remotely controlled cameras. Over time, if technology can get to the point where the transfer of the camera feeds is fast enough, in-person presence could be phased out and electronic monitoring would remain. Either way, an American third-party presence would be on-site to ensure that Israeli concerns are addressed if remote or behind-the-glass monitoring raises Israeli concerns that might not be shared by the Palestinians or Jordanians.

There are numerous passport, permit, or visa regimes that can be set up, but the key is that any process would ensure that there is biometric data to confirm the identity of anyone passing through the crossings and that all parties maintain real-time visibility of all crossing data.⁴¹ The PASF, JSE, and IDF would use a shared, state-of-the-art traveler database that would include relevant watch lists, shared data on travelers, biometric data for positive identification, and other relevant information. The passport, visa, or permit application process, which would include biometric data collection, would add another level of confidence to personnel identification so that all sides would be satisfied they knew who was

leaving and entering via these crossings. There would also be a system similar to the U.S. Transportation Security Administration's TSA Pre-Check or the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Global Pass programs. Individuals who qualify for this system, pass a background check, and have no previous problematic history would be part of this system and be able to cross the border without any advance notification. Those who do not pass such a background check would have to provide advance notification prior to crossing the border, as they do now. Personal baggage and cargo passing through a crossing point would be screened with the same equipment and level of detail as that performed at Ben Gurion International Airport.

To illustrate, the crossing point at Allenby would operate in a similar manner as it does today, but with several notable changes. Travelers crossing from Jordan into Palestine would first encounter a Jordanian crossing facility, just as they do today. Once they were cleared by Jordanian security, travelers would enter the personnel facility that is today run by ISF. However, instead of a visible ISF presence, travelers would encounter PASF and American personnel. All parties would be able to electronically monitor all operations on both sides of the border. Some ISF could remain in person (but out of sight or in plain clothes). U.S. representatives would be present throughout the transition and beyond to monitor operations and intervene if necessary.

Both facilities would screen travelers and their baggage with state-of-the-art equipment and procedures as found in modern airports. Private and commercial vehicles would pass through separate facilities, which



A line of vehicles prepares for inspection on the West Bank side of the Allenby Bridge, which would be the major crossing point between a future Palestinian state and Jordan. (Daniel Case/Wikimedia)

would perform detailed vehicle and cargo inspections. These inspections would not be visible to the public, so ISF personnel could participate during a transitional phase. Eventually they would phase out and be replaced with third-party U.S. personnel to whom the ISF would have a direct line of communication and through whom it could raise any concerns even as it maintained a remote or behind-the-glass presence.

If a disagreement arose between ISF and the PASF about the passage of a specific individual or piece of cargo, that person or cargo would remain in place while the situation was referred to the jointly staffed border control center (as described below) for resolution. American third-party personnel would reinspect any baggage or cargo flagged by Israelis as questionable. American third-party representatives would be on hand both at the border crossing and at the border control center to act as additional inspectors and security in the event of Israeli concerns and to help mediate disputes or escalate quickly to higher levels of decisionmaking at the SIVG in the event that a joint decision cannot be made at lower levels.

In addition to the ISF, PASF, and JSF personnel running the day-to-day operations at the crossing points, each open crossing point should have a quick-reaction force (QRF) capability resident in nearby border patrols to deal with emergency situations. An example of an event that would trigger a QRF/border patrol response would be an attempted terrorist attack on or near a crossing point. During the early transition phase, when Israel retains overall responsibility for security in the West Bank and the border patrols on the river remain Israeli, the QRF would be Israeli. Over time, as the border patrols transition to American responsibility, so would the QRF.

BORDER TRACE SECURITY SYSTEM

All borders must be secured by a multilayered border security system, not just a “fence.” The border trace security system is described here with the West Bank-Jordanian border in mind, but the principles apply to all borders. The system would consist of interwoven layers, thereby funneling all traffic to the crossing points: trilateral relationships and intelligence; aerostat-borne monitoring systems; redundant physical barriers, sensors, and monitoring systems; and patrols/QRFs.

The first and outer layer of defense consists of two trilateral relationships backed by robust intelligence-sharing arrangements among Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, and other Arab states that are described in much greater detail in Chapter 6.


The second layer of defense would include sensor systems mounted on tethered, unmanned aerostats. These systems, initially designed for conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, are successfully employed on the U.S.-Mexico border.⁴² The information from these systems would be fed directly into jointly staffed border control centers, described below. This would be a tremendous improvement over the current border regime. As opposed to detecting potential smugglers or terrorists as they hit the border, the system would now detect them miles in advance and Jordanian forces could pick them up before they ever reached the border. And even if they reached the border, there would be border patrols already waiting for them.

As opposed to detecting potential smugglers or terrorists as they hit the border, the [new sensor] system would now detect them miles in advance.

The third layer of the system would be a series of redundant physical barriers and additional sensors. At the center of this layer would be a state-of-the-art, motion-sensitive, electronically monitored and video-monitored, 6-meter, rugged, chain-link fence. All of the information from the sensors on the fences would feed into border control centers. In order to create full situational awareness for all parties, the information would also be fed to an ISF higher headquarters station in Israel, a PASF higher headquarters station in the West Bank, and a JSF higher headquarters station in Jordan. On both sides of the fence there would be 3-meter zones of fine sand (that is graded daily) to detect foot traffic, along with motion sensors under the dirt to detect tunneling. Adjacent to the sanded zones on both sides of the fence, there would be paved roads to accommodate vehicle patrols. Next to the paved patrol roads, there would be either concertina wire or a concrete wall (where necessary to shield patrols from visual observation or sniper fire). Finally, in areas where there is no concrete wall, there would also be a 2- to 3-meter-deep ditch to prevent vehicles from ramming the center fence.

The fourth layer would be roaming, vehicle-borne border patrols that would be conducted on the paved roads on both sides of the border fence. There are multiple options for how these patrols could be conducted, as described in Chapter 2, but we believe that the best alternative that is likely to be accepted by the parties is an American force.

FIGURE 1.
Border Trace Security System Diagram



The fifth layer of defense would be the highly trained Palestinian security forces operating throughout the future state of Palestine, as described in the previous chapter on internal Palestinian security.

It is also important to note current Israeli demands to remain in the entire Jordan River Valley, which would include a highly visible presence in areas that would be quite intrusive to Palestinians and would interfere with farming and economic potential in the valley. Instead, this proposal, by creating additional strategic depth in Jordan and improving the quality of security around the border, could keep all Israeli presence within a 2-kilometer strip from the Jordan River, predominantly east of Highway 90.⁴³ To enhance border security and make such an approach easier for Palestinians to accept, the Palestinian security strip should mirror the security strip that already exists on the Jordanian side of the border. On Jordan's side, there are special arrangements that include not only security towers and patrols, but also requirements for special permits that allow individuals to enter this area for farming purposes. Any upgrades to the Jordanian side of the border security system would be executed by Jordan, and where necessary the United States could provide support through the robust U.S.-Jordan security assistance program. On the Palestinian side, Highway 90 runs north to south along the border of Jordan and the future Palestinian state. There are no Palestinians living east of Highway 90 (although there is a small amount of agricultural development, plus a few related industrial buildings), and patrols could be unintrusive. Moreover, during transition, patrols that included Israelis could remain in unmarked cars, further reducing their visibility. Barracks do not need to be built in this area, but way stations for refueling and resupply that would initially be used by Israeli patrols and then transitioned to U.S. third-party forces could be placed in areas out of the line of sight east of Highway 90.

BORDER CONTROL CENTERS

The data from the crossing points for personnel, baggage, and cargo, as well as the data from sensors and cameras in the border trace security system, would feed into individual headquarter elements in each relevant country so that the ISF, PASF, or JSF could see all of the pertinent data at a center that they unilaterally staff. In addition, there would be border control centers that would have representatives from all relevant parties. For instance, for the border between the West Bank and Israel, the associated border control center would have Israeli and Palestinian observers; for the border between the West Bank and Jordan, the associated center would have

Israeli, Palestinian, and Jordanian representatives. The concept is to ensure that all parties can maintain continuous situational awareness of the border. In the case of the West Bank-Jordan border, Israelis could maintain continuous situational awareness without being seen by the public, thereby achieving security while maintaining the dignity of the Palestinian people. The control centers would also include American personnel. In the event of a disagreement between the parties on how to respond to a particular incident or whether to let a particular individual or piece of cargo through, the situation would be quickly bumped up to the control center and decided jointly. The U.S. liaison could help to facilitate agreement on such questions and if necessary the issue could be quickly escalated to higher levels of the security implementation verification group as described in more detail in Chapter 7.

THE EGYPT-GAZA BORDER

There could obviously only be any real transition in Gaza after a government and security forces that are committed to abiding by the agreement are in place. The Egypt-Gaza border would function much in the same way as described for the West Bank-Jordan border. It would include the necessary technical and security upgrades, joint operations centers, and U.S. third-party force to assist in implementation. The technical challenges on this border require different solutions than those on the Jordanian border, but the principles remain the same.



An Israeli Defense Force (IDF) bulldozer digs for planted explosive devices along the Israel-Gaza border. The security challenges that could emerge from Gaza will require sustained and active Israeli, Palestinian, and Egyptian security cooperation. (MathKnight/Wikimedia)

Israel-Palestine Borders

CROSSING POINTS AND BORDER TRACE

Specific measures on the borders between Israel and Palestine would depend on the final agreement on the future territory of the Palestinian state, which is beyond the scope of this study. But the border security system would incorporate many of the same concepts described above, most notably information sharing. There would be no need for Israelis on the Palestinian side of the crossing points since in this instance Israel would have complete control over its side of the crossings and be able to enforce the security standards it deems necessary. But especially during the transition and as PASF capabilities are still improving, American third-party monitors could remain on the Palestinian side of the border. In addition, once there is a final agreement on a map, Israel should adjust and finish building the security barrier along the agreed border, creating an extra layer of security. The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians could focus jointly on increasing and improving the anti-tunneling technologies that are already a focus of Israeli-American security cooperation.

EXCEPTIONAL SECURITY ZONES AND ANTI-TUNNELING TECHNOLOGY

To ensure the safety of Israelis and Palestinians, certain areas within the West Bank, especially around the Israeli-Palestinian border, would need special treatment. For example, areas adjacent to Ben Gurion International Airport would need to be designated “exceptional security zones.” In these areas, zoning restrictions would limit the height of structures that could otherwise be used by terrorists to fire on air traffic or the airport itself. There could also be restrictions on agriculture in these zones to ensure crops remain below a certain height that could otherwise be used by potential attackers as cover.

There is also significant Israeli concern about the potential for terrorist attacks and smuggling via tunnels. Here, exceptional security zones could become part of the multilayered border defense system by placing limitations on certain construction and activity that would make it extraordinarily difficult to build smuggling tunnels and would further strengthen the robust border security system described above. Anti-tunneling technology is being developed jointly by the United States and Israel and could be added to this layer of the security system along any border. The United States has apparently dedicated \$120 million to this effort over the next three years, and key Israeli defense companies have been brought on board to deal with this issue.⁴⁴ The

number of tunnels discovered or destroyed in the last 12 months seems to indicate that the system is already producing results.⁴⁵

The smuggling challenge is also daunting when it comes to the tunnels being built by Hamas out of Gaza. There is a need for exceptional security zones within Gaza that limit building and crop height immediately adjacent to borders. It is important to note that it would be particularly difficult to build smuggling tunnels from Jordan into Israel given how low the Jordan River drops and the fact that any tunnel would have to be built below the river. That said, the entire Jordan River Valley could be designated an exceptional security zone with provisions agreed upon by the parties.

The exceptional security zones would also have extra patrols to ensure compliance and detect/remove nefarious actors. And as Israel redeploys from the West Bank in a phased manner, these zones would probably be some of the last ones to be handed over to the Palestinians. The American-led SIVG forces implementing and monitoring the agreement would also pay special attention to these zones to ensure that Palestinian commitments are being met.

Both parties would need to agree on the precisely defined location, dimensions, and restrictions associated with each zone. These terms should minimize the intrusion on and limitation of Palestinian economic activity and sovereignty while ensuring that reasonable security measures are taken.



An IDF soldier stands over a tunnel constructed by Hamas during Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in July 2014. Countering the increasingly sophisticated tunnel warfare doctrine of organizations such as Hamas is a long-term security challenge for Israel. (Israel Defense Forces/ Flickr)

Other Border-Related Issues

GAZA-WEST BANK CORRIDOR

When conditions permit, a transit corridor would be established between the West Bank and Gaza that can accommodate a multilane highway with traffic in each direction (so single-car accidents do not block the entire corridor), a railroad, and possibly communications lines, electricity, water, natural gas, etc. Both sides of the corridor would be sealed with a border trace security system, just like the borders between the West Bank and Israel or Gaza and Israel. The corridor would have perpendicular bridge or tunnel crossings to enable Israeli traffic to cross uninhibited north and south, for instance, where current highways would cross the corridor. The corridor would also contain one crossing-point facility on each end to ensure positive identification of all personnel crossing in either direction. The facilities would contain the same biometric identification equipment, access to watch lists, etc., that are in the border-crossing facilities. The crossing-point facilities would be run by the PASF, monitored by U.S. third-party forces, and remotely monitored by ISF. Individuals associated with terrorist organizations or other nefarious activity would not be allowed to cross in either direction.

EARLY WARNING SITES

Israel operates a small number of sites on the high ground in the West Bank to provide early warning of threats from the east. The systems and technology associated with these sites are important to Israeli security. However, the personnel needed to operate, maintain, and secure these sites would need to continuously rotate, which would be a very visible affront to Palestinian sovereignty, especially near high-population areas. In the early years the ISF could continue to maintain the sites. Over time the sites could be maintained by nonuniformed Israeli operators embedded within U.S. forces that are part of the SIVG. In the long term, we believe that with additional investment it will likely be possible to find alternative technological solutions using aerostats, satellites, or other technology that could replace the need for the early warning sites altogether. But if that objective is unattainable, a continued nonuniformed Israeli presence embedded within U.S. forces is a reasonable long-term alternative.

Scenario: A Conventional Threat from the East

Some argue that Israel requires the entire Jordan River Valley in perpetuity or the ability to re-enter certain areas to mount a conventional defense to protect against

a conventional threat from Jordan.⁴⁶ But the reality is that such scenarios were focused primarily on a major land attack from Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army – an army that is a shell of its former self and not capable of mounting that type of an attack. It is hard to imagine any scenario in the near term that involves a conventional threat from the east.


Beyond that, any assault from the east would only be possible if the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan failed to meet the challenge. From this perspective it is important to remember that Israel already has an initial strong check against such a scenario, given the strong security relationship between the two countries. Moreover, there is a strong commitment by the United States to Jordan's security, including billions in security assistance and deployments of American forces that are already in Jordan to help the kingdom manage the effect of the civil war in Syria and the threats from ISIS. Indeed, any agreement between Israelis and Palestinians could also be reinforced by a side deal between the United States and Jordan to ensure Jordan's security and territorial sovereignty, thus providing greater assurances to both Israel and Jordan. And as discussed previously, there would also be a consultation mechanism that Israel could invoke with the United States to address potential regional contingencies.

Any agreement between Israelis and Palestinians could also be reinforced by a side deal between the United States and Jordan to ensure Jordan's security and territorial sovereignty, thus providing greater assurances to both Israel and Jordan.

Even if the security situation in Jordan changed dramatically, there would be ample time to detect that, and it would prompt a security re-evaluation far broader in scope than just the need to defend against a conventional military invasion. Moreover, the relatively low number of passable roads (lines of communication), especially as one approaches the Jordan Valley from the east, would stack up the tank columns for miles, making them easy work for airpower, as the Iraqis learned on the "highway of death" in 1991.⁴⁷ This would create an opportunity for Israeli forces to cut off much of an assault via airstrike

before these forces could even get to the Jordan River. Given Israel's qualitative military edge, there is no opposing air force in the Middle East that could credibly prevent Israel from achieving relatively quick air dominance and using it to stop a land invasion.

Finally, it is also important to remember that in such a scenario the Palestinians and Israelis would likely have common interests in stopping such a threat. Palestinians would likely be open to an Israeli re-entry into certain areas of high ground and along the borders if it were truly a state of emergency in order to stop the threat. Indeed, one need only look to the Sinai, where Israelis and Egyptian have in recent years been amending the security arrangements agreed to in the peace treaty in order to deal with the local terrorism problem in that area.⁴⁸ Similar adjustments can be made in the future in the event of crisis but will be too difficult to make part of the agreement today.



The border security layer supporting a two-state solution will require a strong Jordanian security presence on their side of the border - here a command post overlooks the Dead Sea on the Jordanian side - and extensive security cooperation among Israel, a Palestinian state, and Jordan. (Faris knight/Wikimedia)



CHAPTER 5

Non-Ground Domains

Beyond the key ground components are three additional domains – airspace, maritime, and electromagnetic spectrum – that must be addressed as part of any security system.

Airspace Security

Airspace security, at first glance, appears to be very difficult to achieve in any kind of shared arrangement where key infrastructure and conflicting populations are in such close proximity. However, the right airspace structures, rules, and procedures, correctly applied, make this problem quite solvable. Four key components would ensure the security of both parties: vetted personnel; clear air traffic procedures for normal and emergency situations; up-to-date air traffic control facilities and equipment; and secure airport infrastructure and procedures.

PALESTINIAN AIRSPACE

The current trend in worldwide aviation, particularly in areas where airspace is crowded, is to decouple airspace from political boundaries and create larger blocks of airspace managed by one controlling agency. This simplifies routes, reduces frequency changes, and diminishes radio traffic, all of which enhance flight safety. The European Union, for instance, is in the process of creating a system of “functional airspace blocks.”⁴⁹ This trend suggests it would be unwise to designate a separate airspace block over the future state of Palestine higher than 10,000 feet mean sea level (MSL). However, Palestinian needs for sovereign airspace can still be met by establishing Palestinian airspace above the future state of Palestine from the surface to 10,000 feet MSL and by building airports in the Jordan Valley and Gaza and associated Palestinian airspace (a “controlled traffic region” or CTR) around and above them. The CTRs would be cylindrical, centered on the airport, extending from the surface to 10,000 feet above MSL, and 10 nautical miles (nm) in diameter (approximately the width of the Jordan Valley abeam Jericho. The CTR overlap of Jordanian or Egyptian and Israeli territory would of course require Jordanian or Egyptian and Israeli permission, respectively). Figure 2 shows approximate potential locations for the airports. There would also be provision for an air corridor to accommodate air traffic between Gaza and the West Bank, most logically above the ground corridor connecting the two. Palestinian air traffic would be restricted to helicopter airlift for VIPs, counterterrorism units and medevac, as well as licensed commercial carriers. Private civilian aviation would not be permitted.

It is also important to note that designating Palestinian airspace from the surface to 10,000 feet MSL over the future state of Palestine presents no grave imposition on Israeli Air Force operations. IAF aircraft would still be able to transit the West Bank from north to south and vice versa; they would simply have to do so

above 10,000 feet so as not to intrude on the daily lives of Palestinians – an important element for Palestinian sovereignty. Military training areas above 10,000 feet could still be utilized. Since a modern, high-performance jet aircraft can climb to 10,000 feet in less than two minutes, this is not much of an inconvenience. Helicopter traffic would be more inconvenienced, but if (after transition) there are no longer Israeli citizens or security personnel in the West Bank, then rotary-wing flights would not be needed except in severe, national defense emergencies where both Israeli and Palestinian citizens are threatened. As described below, if there is such a national defense emergency, then Israeli military air traffic controllers would take control of the entire airspace above Israel and Palestine until the emergency is resolved. Transfer would be instantaneous and debate would take place after, not before, the incident was resolved. Finally, provisions can be made for rotary-wing flights on the 2-kilometer strip adjacent to the Jordan River, should both parties deem this useful.

PERSONNEL (PILOTS AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS)

In order to operate in or control Palestinian airspace, pilots and controllers would first be extensively vetted and then enter and remain in a personnel reliability program (PRP) modeled on the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) PRP. The vetting process would be similar to that required to obtain a security clearance, where investigators ensure an individual does not have ties to foreign governments or terrorist organizations and is not susceptible to bribery because of financial, marital, social, or other problems. The U.S. DoD PRP ensures that personnel who work with nuclear weapons remain of sound mind and body by monitoring behavioral and physical health.⁵⁰ The PRP for Palestinian pilots and controllers would operate in a similar manner but would also maintain vigilance for potential influence by terrorist organizations or foreign governments hostile to Israel or Palestine. Unlike a security clearance periodic reinvestigation that only occurs once every five or more years, the PRP would maintain continuous vigilance over individuals in the program. Pilots and controllers would be required to remain in the PRP throughout their service. Palestinian pilots or controllers who are not vetted or who do not remain in the PRP will not be allowed to operate in Palestinian airspace.

Palestinian pilots and controllers would be trained, certified, and licensed to the standards codified by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Their basic training could be conducted in any state where training meets ICAO standards.⁵¹

Pilots and controllers would receive special training and certification on the flight procedures for Israeli and Palestinian airspace agreed upon by both parties. The certification process for pilots would include a written examination and an in-flight check ride in Palestinian airspace conducted by a certified flight examiner. During the certification process, pilots would acknowledge in writing that deviation from established normal and/or emergency procedures could result in their aircraft being shot down.

PROCEDURES AND AIRSPACE ARRANGEMENTS

During normal operations, Palestinian controllers would manage the CTRs and control air traffic over the Palestinian airports up to an agreed altitude – for example, 10,000 feet MSL. Above 10,000 feet MSL, air traffic would be controlled by an area control center (ACC) that covers a larger geographical area – in this case, the Tel Aviv Flight Information Region (FIR). Israeli aircraft should only transit the West Bank or Gaza above 10,000 feet MSL and should not penetrate the Palestinian CTR without permission.

When a pilot files a flight plan with Palestinian Air Traffic Control, that same flight plan will be passed to Israeli controllers for their situational awareness. The radar display data of air traffic above Palestine would be shared by Israeli and Palestinian controllers so that both would operate with a common picture.

As mentioned above, one key to success is the correct design of air defense emergency procedures. There are three types of air defense emergencies: aircraft deviating from procedures, an unknown aircraft approaching Israeli or Palestinian airspace, or a clearly hostile aircraft.⁵² In the event of any air defense emergency, Israeli military controllers would immediately take full control of and responsibility for all airspace and air traffic above Israel and Palestine. This would allow Israel's substantial air defense capabilities to defend both states. Israeli aircraft would be able to fly over Palestinian territory at any altitude necessary to deal with the threat. Once the emergency had been resolved, control of and responsibility for Palestinian airspace would revert to Palestinian controllers. Transfer of control in either direction must be acknowledged by both sides. It will be very important to clearly identify and define in advance the conditions that trigger an emergency. This can become politically difficult as Palestinians will fear that Israel will use an approach that triggers too many such emergencies while Israelis will resist any limitations on their flexibility. The more clear and detailed these procedures are, the better.

Each such incident would be reviewed by both sides to resolve any disputes and identify lessons learned. It bears repeating that during an air defense emergency, transfer of control of airspace must pass immediately from Palestinian to Israeli military controllers. If an unknown or hostile aircraft is identified, there is no time to argue whether control should be transferred. Transfer must be immediate. The situation can be reviewed after the emergency has passed.

If an airport is constructed in the Jordan Valley and/or Gaza, a demand the Palestinians have often made, then standard terminal arrivals routes (STARs) and standard instrument departures (SIDs) (i.e., the flight routes, altitude restrictions, speed restrictions, radio and navigational aid frequencies, waypoints, and other procedures associated with flying in and out of the airport) would be designed to avoid Israeli population centers and, as mentioned above, pilots would be certified before they would be allowed to fly the procedures. STARs would direct aircraft inbound to Jericho from the west to transit Israel above Flight Level (FL) 150, and SIDs would direct westbound aircraft to climb to FL 150 (above 15,000 feet) before crossing Israel. Any flight crossing Israel would also have to receive diplomatic overflight clearance from Israel beforehand.

The parties would need to agree on the type and size of aircraft allowed to operate in Palestinian airspace (e.g., helicopter vs. fixed wing, maximum gross weight, maximum passenger capacity).

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

Palestinian air traffic controllers would have facilities that are physically separate but electronically linked to Israeli controllers. Reliable and redundant communication systems must be in place. In the event of an air defense emergency, time and conditions permitting, liaison officers should be exchanged between the facilities.

Palestinian controllers must have up-to-date air traffic control facilities and equipment. An example of design criteria can be found in the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration's Air Traffic Control Tower and Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility Design Guidelines.⁵³ Air traffic data for Palestinian airspace must be visible to both Palestinian and Israeli controllers.

Israeli controllers must have the technical capacity to seamlessly take control of Palestinian airspace and air traffic in the event of an air defense emergency. They must also have the capacity to seamlessly return control to Palestinian controllers.

FIGURE 2.
Potential Locations of Palestinian Airports



AIRPORT

Like airspace management in general, at first glance an airport seems to be a difficult security challenge in a two-state context. But as with airspace, the right procedures, equipment, and infrastructure would enable safe airport operations that maintain security for both populations. The most feasible location is the Jordan Valley (see Figure 2). Although the flight distances between the Jordan Valley and Jerusalem are short and therefore appear intimidating, the reality is that Jordan’s Queen Alia International Airport is already in close proximity to Israel, and Amman’s Marka Airport is even closer. Yet in both cases, proper air traffic procedures keep all parties safe. Additionally, as noted above, an airport in the Jordan Valley would be used only by vetted pilots who remain in a personnel reliability program, something that is not required of pilots flying in and out of Jordan today. The second most feasible location would be the southeast corner of the Gaza Strip, at the location of the now-closed Gaza International Airport. This location is slightly more challenging because a normal CTR that is 10 nautical miles in diameter would overlap territory in Israel and Egypt. This would be technically easy but politically difficult to achieve.

Modern airports are designed with security arrangements from the ground up. Passengers and cargo would be managed with even more stringent procedures than would be used at an international border crossing, described in Chapter 5 on borders. Both Israeli and Palestinian immigration and security personnel would maintain continuous, real-time awareness of all people entering and leaving via an airport. Additionally, passengers would be pre-screened and approved for travel at their airport of embarkation before boarding aircraft bound for a Palestinian airport, just as passengers are today when their destination is the United States or Israel. Likewise, all baggage and cargo would be pre-screened before being loaded onto an aircraft. The perimeter of an airport would be secured in the same manner as a border described in Chapter 5.

Some of the same challenges regarding Israeli presence at Palestinian crossings and the possible impingement on Palestinian sovereignty would apply to the airport just as they do to other border crossings. But a combination of shared information and close collaboration between the Israeli government and the states at the ports of embarkation could alleviate much of the

problem. Just as flights to Israel have special security measures implemented at the airport of embarkation, so could flights to Palestine. Additionally, U.S. representatives could be visible at the Palestinian airport and part of the monitoring system to ensure that if Israel raised any concerns, they would be addressed.

Maritime Security

Compared with airspace security, maritime security is fairly easy to attain because of the relatively slow speed of watercraft vs. aircraft. Where the security challenge in the airspace environment is speed, the challenge in the maritime environment is volume – both in terms of potential numbers of vessels and their individual carrying capacity. This risk is mitigated by analogous elements from the ground security and airspace security domains that relate to maritime zones and a Palestinian seaport.

As in the airspace domain, Palestinians would govern their territorial waters off Gaza, but with certain restrictions that enable Israelis to maintain overall security. Per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Israeli navy can intercept, board, and inspect any ship in international waters, 12 nautical miles offshore and beyond. This internationally recognized process would be the first (and deep) outer layer of maritime security. The second layer would initially be an exception to standard UNCLOS provisions. Rather than the standard 12 nm zone, Palestinian waters would extend from the shoreline to 6 NM. Between 6 nm and 12 nm, there would be a security zone where the Israeli navy would patrol and, as necessary, stop and board incoming ships for inspection. Inside the 6 NM line, the Palestinian Coastal Police would be responsible for the third layer of maritime security. Over time, Palestinian control would extend to 12 NM and later to the 20 NM limit as described in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of 1995.⁵⁴ The fourth layer would be security procedures at the port, described below.

A fifth layer of security would be the maritime security zones along the northeast and southwest sides of Palestinian territorial waters. These are labeled Zones K and M, respectively, in the Interim Agreement.⁵⁵ Zone K is 1.5 NM wide and extends from the shoreline at the north end of the Gaza Strip to 20 NM offshore. Zone M is 1 nm wide and extends from the shoreline at the south end of the Gaza Strip to 20 nm offshore. No commercial or private vessels would be allowed in either zone. Israeli naval forces and Palestinian Coastal Police would patrol Zone K. Egyptian and Palestinian Coastal Police would patrol Zone M.

Palestinian and Israeli security personnel would jointly staff a maritime operations center that would monitor all sea traffic operating in or near Palestinian waters. This would represent a sixth layer of security, even though it overlaps layers one through three. Radar or optical sensors mounted on a 150-foot tower would have unobstructed line-of-sight coverage out to nearly 15 nm. An aerostat tethered at 10,000 feet above ground level could monitor out up to 200 nm.⁵⁶ This sensor array would ensure that no seaborne traffic could infiltrate Gaza without detection.


There are three options with regard to a Palestinian seaport. The first is to channel all inbound ships to the Israeli ports at Ashdod or Eilat. Cargo would be off-loaded, inspected, and then shipped over land to Gaza and, via a transit corridor, to the West Bank. This option is the most viable economically and offers Israel the most secure venue. It is less appealing to the Palestinians as it does not provide for the expression of sovereignty. They also fear that Israel would unnecessarily slow commerce into Gaza.

Where the security challenge in the airspace environment is speed, the challenge in the maritime environment is volume.

The second option is to complete construction on a purpose-built port in Gaza. The technical challenge to this option is the shallow water along the Gaza coast, but it is still a possibility especially if it is politically important to the Palestinians.

As previously mentioned, the major challenge in maritime security is the large volume of cargo that can be carried by vessels. However, since the port would essentially be built from scratch, the design could include inspection facilities where Israeli security officers could take part in the inspection process out of the line of sight of the Palestinian public. These officers would not have to wear IDF uniforms and could take additional steps to lower their visibility. To ensure there is time to inspect all cargo, either the size or number (or both) of the ships entering the port could be metered or otherwise limited. However, given the size of the Palestinian population and economy, for many years to come the likely demand signal for port traffic would be a single container ship per day. There would also have to be a remediation process in the event that there was a dispute between Israeli and Palestinian security officials at the port on whether

FIGURE 3.
Gaza Maritime Security and Port Options



Aerostat sensor range is illustrative only. Actual range would be dependent on selected sensors and the altitude of the aerostat.

a particular shipment should go through. This could be addressed through the presence of a third party or be part of the responsibility of the SIVG, which is described in greater detail in Chapter 7.

If the Gaza port option is chosen, another way to enhance its security would be to surround the port with a semicircular special economic and security zone. The boundary of the zone would be secured with a border trace security fence system (as described above in the ground security section) with a single access point, through which only authorized personnel and cleared passengers would be allowed to pass. Special economic zones are standard practice around the globe and operate under different rules than the rest of the country and thus could allow for special rules while still meeting Palestinian requirements for sovereignty and dignity.

A third option is a man-made “Gaza Island.” This proposal has existed for several years, but the political situation in Gaza has of course kept it on the shelf.⁵⁷ The island would be 3 to 5 kilometers from Gaza, be 6 to 10 square kilometers in total area and have a connecting bridge to the land. A seaport and airport could be based there with inspections and security measures for cargo and personnel that would be consistent with

the measures described above for airports and other border crossings. The island would also provide additional security for Israel, as in the event of an emergency it could be easily isolated from the mainland.

Under any option, all inbound ships would be met at the outer boundary by a maritime security forces vessel, which would accompany the ship all the way to the port to ensure no illicit cargo offloads occur before arrival at port.

A particular concern for Israelis is the security of the gas platforms adjacent to Ashkelon. These would require special attention, but this is already true and accounted for today.

Another option to enhance maritime security would be to build a “sea fence” that would extend into the Mediterranean Sea along the maritime border between Israeli and Palestinian waters. This would be designed to thwart small-boat attacks emanating from the Gaza shoreline and landing in Israel. With a sea fence, attackers would not be able to travel up the coastline and their deviation out to sea to circumnavigate the fence would ensure detection and interception. Such a fence would reach all the way to the sea floor and thus also prevent infiltration by semisubmersible or fully submersible watercraft such as those improvised to smuggle narcotics across maritime boundaries.

Electromagnetic Spectrum Security

The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) may not leap to the forefront of the average person's mind in discussions of security, but management of the EMS is a significant security issue. The EMS is a limited resource with many demands competing for its use, from civilian cellphones to military radars. Uncoordinated use of the EMS by parties in close proximity can lead to interference and/or degradation of critical systems. To date, Israel has dominated the use of the EMS to the detriment of Palestinians. If a two-state agreement is reached, shared use of the EMS will need immediate attention.

The 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement has much to offer on this topic. In Annex III (Civil Affairs), Article 36 (Telecommunications), the Interim Agreement addresses the electromagnetic sphere and telecommunications, as well as general principles for both, and offers schedules (5 and 6), lists of approved frequencies for use. Some of the information is outdated due to the advance of technology in the last two decades, but many of the concepts and principles provide valid starting points for cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations' specialized agency for information and communication technologies. "We allocate global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, develop the technical standards that ensure networks and technologies seamlessly interconnect, and strive to improve access to information and communication technologies to underserved communities worldwide."⁵⁸ The state of Israel is a member of the ITU and the state of Palestine, as an observer member of the U.N., is an observer member of the ITU. The ITU provides a forum for public-private collaboration among states, telecommunications governing bodies, and private companies.

The most critical challenge in the domain of the EMS is "limited bandwidth." Until recently, regulators deconflicted use of the EMS by assigning bands of frequencies to either civilian or military use, and then subsections of those bands or discreet frequencies to specific uses and users. This worked as long as demand for EMS remained relatively low. However, over the last two decades, use of the EMS has grown exponentially with the introduction of wireless internet, Bluetooth, and 3G and 4G cellphone data, not to mention the innumerable EMS applications for military, police, and emergency response functions.

There are several ways that Israelis and Palestinians can improve their management and allocation of the EMS between them that would actually enhance the capabilities of both parties. Aging transmission equipment that bleeds over several frequencies, particularly

on the Palestinian side, can be replaced with modern equipment that uses much cleaner signals. For example, the bandwidth taken by one old television transmitter can accommodate a half-dozen modern television broadcast channels. EMS management tools such as SPECTRUM XXI can vastly improve EMS efficiency. As the Defense Information Systems Agency explains: "SPECTRUM XXI addresses the automated spectrum management requirements processes of the Combatant Commands, Joint Task Force, Services, and the sustaining-base elements. The resulting benefit is interference-free frequencies for battlefield use while also ensuring that coordination of frequency assignments through national and host nation approval continues."⁵⁹

Israelis and Palestinians can improve their management and allocation of the EMS, which would actually enhance the capabilities of both parties.

Emerging programs such as the Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information System (GEMSIS) will "transform spectrum operations from a pre-planned and static frequency assignment process into a dynamic, responsive, and agile capability."⁶⁰ The bottom-line strategy for this approach is that by significantly enhancing the efficiency and use of EMS by both sides, a security system can actually increase the overall access to EMS for both sides and create opportunities for improvement for both Israelis and Palestinians.



CHAPTER 6

Regional Security

The Israeli security community, much as the general public, considers Israel's integration into a regional security framework as both an important additional layer of security and the ultimate manifestation of regional acceptance.

Concurrently, regional developments have propelled several important Middle East players – most notably Saudi Arabia, its Gulf Cooperation Council partners, Egypt, and Jordan – toward cooperation against common security threats. This trend has accelerated with the emergence of the ISIS challenge to regional order and with heightened concern about Iran's regional ambitions.

Although these countries have intimated an interest in incorporating Israel's intelligence and other security capabilities in addressing common challenges, with the exception of Egypt and Jordan they have refused to do so prior to a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

Given that background, it is commonly expected that a two-state agreement that leads to normalization of relations between Israel and the relevant Arab states would open important opportunities for security cooperation, including in expanding Israel's access to intelligence and essentially creating another layer of external security.

The remainder of this section describes some of the potential security opportunities that would be available in the event of an agreement, the prerequisites for pursuing to them, and their potential contribution both to reaching an agreement and to enhancing Israel's security in a two-state reality. While committing no one, this part of the study reflects findings and advice gathered during many hours of consultations with security experts from several Arab countries across the region, as well as with Israelis and Palestinians.



Secretary of State John Kerry meets with the Ministerial Delegation of the Arab Peace Initiative Follow Up Committee in Paris, France on September 8, 2013. Normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world through the Arab Peace Initiative would be an important pillar of future Israeli security in the context of a permanent status agreement. (U.S. Department of State/ Flickr)

Common Threat Perceptions and Potential Opportunities for Regional Cooperation

Israel's integration into the region holds the promise of enhancing its security both in the direct context of a bilateral agreement with the Palestinians and in the broader, regional context. In the ideal world, Israel's integration could be part of a broader move by the region toward a common regional security framework. But even if that is not possible for the foreseeable future, many of the benefits could accrue to Israel through enhanced bilateral cooperation with states in the region with whom it has very limited or no relations.

At the regional level, Israel's incorporation into a cooperative security system or its upgraded bilateral relations with numerous Arab states is essential for addressing common regional security challenges – most notably extremism and terrorism. These challenges cannot be met effectively absent multilateral intelligence cooperation and operational coordination. Such a regional framework – however loosely defined – will also provide Israel and the other participants with new venues to air security-related misunderstandings and peacefully resolve conflicts among them. Such a framework will also contribute to Israel's security by offering a broad political cover to Jordan and Egypt, thus reducing occasional pressure on them – from their publics and from other Arab states – to terminate security cooperation with Israel when violence erupts in the Israeli-Palestinian theater.

New and enhanced security relations between Israel and the relevant Arab states will contribute directly to reaching an agreement with the Palestinians and to its successful implementation. These improved relations will partially compensate for perceived added risks associated with redeployment from the West Bank by providing Israel with another layer of security, which reinforces those described previously. Thus, early integration into a gradually emerging regional security system will contribute to the support of the Israeli security establishment and the general public for the negotiations and their two-state outcome.

Concurrently, it will encourage Israel to accommodate a greater role for its new Arab partners in the peace process with the Palestinians. Here, political cover extended by Arab partners may prove vital in enabling the weak Palestinian polity to make some of the tough decisions required for a deal. Likewise, Arab investment in the Palestinian economy and the new state's institutions may prove essential in sustaining Palestinian governance and security institutions during the negotiations and in the aftermath of an agreement. In short, the regional context can serve to mutually reinforce regional security and peace negotiations: Progress toward and in the negotiations will make it possible for relevant Arab states to risk exposure of security cooperation with Israel, whereas such evolving security cooperation will mitigate somewhat Israelis' apprehensions regarding the morning after a two-state agreement is implemented.

RISK OF LOST OPPORTUNITIES

Perceived common threats and joint interests have already prompted countries in the region to experiment in cooperative regional security. Thus far, Israel has been consistently excluded. The Saudi-led coalition for the war in Yemen, as well as the Saudi-initiated 34-nation “Islamic Coalition Against Terror,” including a major joint military exercise, are but the most recent examples.⁶¹ Had Israel been invited, it might not have wished to be visibly associated with the former and probably would have confined its role in either to non-combat involvement. But its flat exclusion represents the type of missed opportunity to join emerging coalitions of like-minded states that will continue to persist unless there is progress on the Palestinian front.

Indeed, for several years now the relevant Arab states have conveyed to Israel – both privately and on occasion in public; both via third parties but also directly – their interest in developing security cooperation against common threats. However, just as clearly, these countries consistently specify two prerequisites for Israel’s integration: progress toward a permanent status agreement with the Palestinians and a positive – if qualified – response to the Arab Peace Initiative.⁶²

Consequently, with the exception of Jordan and Egypt – where security cooperation is highly developed and to a limited but important extent is visible to the public – the very limited security cooperation between GCC and other Arab countries and Israel has been quiet, scant, and sporadic.⁶³ Thus, such cooperation hardly exhausts its potential contribution to regional stability, to Israel’s security, or to the Israelis’ sense of security.

COMMON THREAT PERCEPTIONS

When exploring threat perceptions with regional and Israeli security experts, as well as the venues for addressing those threats, they may differ in prioritizing threats to their respective countries, but their lists feature the very same threats and they advocate the same remedy of harnessing multilateral resources via regional cooperation. The common list of threats features two separate clusters.

First are direct concerns about hard security. Iran’s meddling in other countries’ affairs, its support for terrorism, its ballistic missile capabilities, and its nuclear ambitions remain major common concerns despite the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).⁶⁴ Israel and many of its Arab neighbors also share common concerns about radical Islamic movements, especially ISIS, al Qaeda, and their derivatives, given the challenge their cross-border terror networks



Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and U.S. President Jimmy Carter perform the famous “Triple Handshake,” at the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979, which significantly deepened security relations between the countries. (Tal Shabtai/Government Press Office/Flickr)

present to regional stability and to individual regimes. To state but one example: Regime stability in Jordan, challenged from the east (Iraq), north (Syria), and now possibly south as well (Sinai), has long been a shared interest of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other regional players. These countries also increasingly view Hezbollah as a common regional threat and, like Israel, some Arab states view Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad as potential dangers as well.⁶⁵ Cross-border arms smuggling via ground, maritime, or air routes also remains a common concern, as do cyberattacks. In all of these arenas, single-state efforts are commonly judged insufficient. In all of them there is a potential for Israel and its relevant Arab neighbors to work together multilaterally or bilaterally to improve their respective and common security.

There is a second cluster of less direct security threats that jointly affect Israel and many of its neighbors. The collapse of nation-states in the region, especially in Syria but also Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, results in the spread of instability. A major consequence of this phenomenon has been cross-border influx of refugees – presenting a humanitarian, socio-economic challenge but also an associated security risk. Cross-border criminal activity also remains a common challenge, as do natural disasters and other humanitarian crises.⁶⁶

It is important to note that many of these threats can be somewhat mitigated bilaterally. However, ideally over time a multilateral structure would be superior for responding to many of these challenges given that they are common to several like-minded states; they cannot be addressed effectively by any single state; and a number of these countries will likely wish to cooperate in addressing them.

Hovering over the entire list of perceived threats is a common perception that the United States is in the process of reducing its direct security involvement in the region. Whether true, inflated, or imagined, this view has had an important effect on countries that for decades have relied on the United States as their most potent security shield.⁶⁷ This perception further reinforces the conclusion that to protect themselves, the affected countries in the region must find ways to cooperate both bilaterally and in broader frameworks.

A Regional Security System

Below we describe the key objectives and structures associated with an Israeli approach to regional security cooperation. In an ideal situation, once an agreement with the Palestinians is reached, these concepts can be used as the basis for a multilateral regional security institution. However, many of these same principles can be applied bilaterally by Israel with a number of the Arab states or multilaterally on an ad hoc basis.

OBJECTIVES

A Middle East regional security framework should serve a number of common objectives. At the bilateral level, Israel can use enhanced cooperation to respond jointly to common threats or even conduct jointly coordinated operations. Direct bilateral discussions with states with which it previously had no or very limited relations will also create new opportunities to peacefully resolve misunderstandings and disputes.

If the region can move beyond enhanced bilateral cooperation and use the opportunity of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement to forge new multilateral arrangements, the objectives can become more expansive. A multilateral arrangement should be able to jointly harness resources to present a more effective deterrent against common threats. In some cases it will also present an opportunity to establish a division of responsibilities and coordinate respective activities – including combat missions if needed – in addressing common threats. It can also support member-states when they seek assistance and serve as a venue for the peaceful resolution of disputes among its members. Such a mechanism can also contribute to regional and global stability via cooperative arrangements with other regional security structures. And it can facilitate cooperation among civilians across the region in pursuit of opportunities that are not security-related. As described above, another relevant objective for such a cooperative framework, would be to contribute to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and ensuring implementation of the agreement.



Secretary of State Kerry, Jordan's King Abdullah II, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meet in Amman, Jordan, to discuss strategies to reduce tensions in the region. (U.S. Department of State/ Flickr)

MEMBERSHIP AND STRUCTURE

Participation in the envisioned regional security framework should be open to all states in the region that accept its entry terms. These should include a commitment to regional stability, support for the API, support for a Palestinian-Israeli negotiated two-state agreement, and – once such an agreement is achieved – willingness to enter into full diplomatic relations with Israel. Again, even if a multilateral structure takes a long time to develop, these basic principles can apply to countries in the region that are prepared to enter into direct bilateral relations with Israel in the context of progress with the Palestinians.

Countries outside the region that share these objectives and can contribute to their attainment, such as the United States and Russia, as well as relevant organizations (i.e., the European Union, NATO, the Arab League), should be invited to participate in the framework activities but not in its decision processes.

The regional framework shall comprise two layers of membership:

1. The “inside envelope,” made up of two clusters of three “founding partners” each: one, related to the West Bank and involving Israel, Palestine, and Jordan; the other, related to the Gaza Strip, involving Israel, Palestine, and Egypt.
2. The “outer envelope” will be open also to Saudi Arabia, its GCC partners, and possibly other states in North Africa and elsewhere.

THE INNER ENVELOPE

These two clusters of three members each – which may in time evolve into a single quartet – are to form a security layer beyond their contribution to security arrangements associated directly with the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Assuming a regional architecture of this type proves possible at some point, given the long history of cooperation among members of the “inside envelope,” they can be expected to serve as the core group around which the “outer envelope” gradually evolves.

THE OUTER ENVELOPE

This broader structure – whether involving a set of bilateral relations or evolving into a multilateral framework – will contribute to Israel’s security in primarily two ways. First is by expanding security arrangements associated with an agreement with the Palestinians. Here, the respective contribution of resources of all participating states and their coordinated efforts against common threats will expand Israel’s “strategic depth” far beyond the Palestinian-Israeli theater and the areas covered by the inner envelope. Second, this broader structure will contribute by jointly addressing common challenges in the broader region, possibly even with the support of nonmember participants.

Ultimately, two concurrent, mutually reinforcing processes are envisioned. First, progress on the Palestinian issue will facilitate Israel’s gradual integration into a regional security structure. Second, Israel’s integration regionally will enhance prospects for progress on the Palestinian issue and implementation of a permanent status agreement.

GRADUALISM

Common threats, however potent and imminent, will not erase the effect of decades of hostility and occasional wars. That history, coupled with Arab public sympathy with the Palestinians, means that embracing Israel into a cooperative security structure will not happen overnight. Progress is likely to be slow and will not be immune to the ebbs and flows of the negotiating process; parties’ conduct regarding issues of cooperation; and differences concerning unrelated areas of relevance. A number of intra-Arab rivalries will also complicate joint cooperative efforts.

Thus, Israel’s incorporation into a regional security structure can at best be expected to evolve gradually. It can begin once a promising phase in the Israeli-Palestinian discourse is in sight, and once Israel responds to the API. Progress can then take place concurrent

with progress in the negotiations, and it may reach full maturity, into a comprehensive security-political system, with their successful conclusion and implementation.

In its early phase, the inner envelope will evolve from the current separate bilateral cooperation frameworks into the two trilateral structures, incorporating the Palestinians in each, or merge into a single, quadrilateral framework. This will include the institutionalization of all relevant procedures, protocols, facilities, and communication systems required for effective cooperation.

Once the outer envelope enters into play, it may initially feature definition of norms of conduct and exploration of infrastructure requirements, as well as agreement on and testing of procedures; however, all will occur within an operational mode that is strictly ad hoc, limited in duration, and focused exclusively on non-military tasks.

03 SECTION

Transitioning to the End State



CHAPTER 7

Transition Process After an Agreement

The key to any transition plan will be twofold. For Palestinians, they will need to see a realistic end to the occupation and real and visible changes on the ground quickly that credibly demonstrate that change is happening. This will be necessary to cause the fundamental political shift that will persuade many Palestinian fence-sitters to support the agreement instead of rejecting it and sympathizing with violators of the agreement.

For Israelis, they will need to know that there will not be arbitrary timetables that force a premature redeployment that leaves Israel vulnerable. To address this, there would be a conditions-dependent redeployment with agreed target timetables. A security implementation verification group consisting of Israeli, Palestinian, and American security professionals would be established to implement the transition and would set up a clearly defined set of metrics based primarily on evaluating PASF capabilities and construction of infrastructure. The SIVG would provide training to the PASF, and a separate and objective evaluation cell would judge PASF performance. If the SIVG judged that the Palestinians had hit a particular series of targets, then a redeployment in a specific area would proceed as planned. If it were deemed that the Palestinians had not hit a specific metric, then the SIVG would develop a remediation plan to repair the deficiencies.

The Transition Process and the Security Implementation and Verification Group

Transfer of responsibility from Israeli to Palestinian security forces in the West Bank would commence via a pre-agreed sequence and timetable that is dependent on PASF performance and physical conditions (such as the completion of construction of a security fence on the border with Jordan). In designing the overall sequence and timetable, emphasis would be on reducing the visible presence of the ISF and increasing the visible presence of the PASF as quickly as possible. The overall transition would occur in five broad phases:

Phase I would probably take six months to one year and would focus on immediate changes in the early months after an agreement to signal to Palestinians the seriousness of Israeli commitment to implementation and to remove to the greatest extent possible the feeling of occupation. Phase II would include the majority of the work in upgrading the security system necessary before transition. It would occur in parallel with Phase III, in which Israel would over time facilitate the relocation of Israeli settlers; note, however, that the IDF would not leave portions of the West Bank where Israeli settlers remained vulnerable without Israeli protection. Phases II and III would likely take about five to seven-and-a-half years. Phase IV would be an area-by-area transfer of responsibility to the Palestinians until they have complete control of all areas except those that will be controlled by a third-party U.S. force. This phase would also take roughly five to seven-and-a-half years, leading

to a total time frame of 10 to 15 years. Phase V would entail the end state described in the previous sections of this study.

The SIVG could be built around the core of the current United States Security Coordinator, but it would need to be significantly larger to accomplish all its functions. It would include international partners, particularly in its training function, and would have Israeli and Palestinian personnel in specific positions of the organization. The SIVG will provide rigorous verification of PASF capability before transition of security responsibility, and continuous verification of ongoing PASF performance after transition. This will be accomplished by including high-level, respected security professionals from all parties in the leadership of the SIVG, as well as objective U.S.-led third-party forces, and by designing an effective dispute resolution mechanism within the SIVG. It will be vital for this group to be outside of the political process.

An American three-star general officer, an Israeli two-star general officer, and a Palestinian two-star general officer or equivalent would jointly lead the SIVG to establish criteria, monitor training, supervise evaluations, and make determinations about whether overall criteria for redeployment had been met. The SIVG would also have liaison cells for appropriate coordination with Egyptian and Jordanian security forces. The SIVG would have major branches for planning; training; evaluation and monitoring; infrastructure construction; intelligence and operations; and personnel and logistics.

FIGURE 4.
Transition Phases





FIGURE 5.
Security Implementation and Verification Group - Organizational Diagram



In general, the work of the SIVG would proceed as follows. The SIVG will conduct a current capabilities assessment of the PASF; will work with Israelis and Palestinians to define the needed/maximum allowed capabilities of the PASF; will direct and conduct all required training and equipping of the PASF to achieve the needed capabilities; will verify that PASF units meet required standards; will oversee transfer of authority for security responsibility and IDF redeployment; and will continuously monitor ongoing PASF performance after transition to ensure standards are maintained.

The SIVG would also plan and oversee the design and construction of the physical components of the security system, such as border fences, crossing-point facilities, operations centers, etc., via an infrastructure construction branch. The primary purpose of SIVG oversight of this area is to ensure that milestones related to construction of infrastructure are met and synchronized with the work in other lines of effort (LoEs) and phases along the way to transfer of authority and redeployment.

The plans branch of the SIVG would create a comprehensive transition plan that covers all domains: ground, air, maritime, and EMS. Each domain would contain several lines of effort with target timetables, milestones, and clear, objective, measurable performance-based

metrics. Milestones would be linked across lines of effort and even across domains such that, for example, redeployment of the IDF from a particular geographic area could require the attainment of several interrelated milestones across domains and across phases. (See Figure 6: Lines of Effort Associated With a Transition Process.) The plans branch would include Israeli and Palestinian officers to help design the transition plan and metrics. Agreement upfront on the plan and the metrics is critical to the success of the transition.

The training branch would then be responsible for raising PASF capabilities up to the agreed standards. This is the only part of the SIVG that would include additional international forces beyond the United States (given the important contributions that a number of partner nations have already made to USSC and to the ongoing training effort) though it would be critical that there would be one unified command and central effort to ensure there is consistency within the PASF. Also, Israelis would not be involved in this piece of the SIVG as it would make more sense for them to not be part of the training mission directly with Palestinians, but instead focused on planning and evaluation/monitoring.

PASF performance against these metrics will be assessed by the evaluation and monitoring branch of

the SIVG. The evaluation branch will be firewalled from the training branch so that those training the PASF are completely separate from those evaluating them, thus ensuring objectivity. The international component of the evaluations branch would be strictly American and would work jointly with Israelis and Palestinians. Many of the metrics used by the evaluations branch would measure Palestinian security forces' ability to achieve adequate levels of capability to take responsibility from the IDF. Other metrics would measure progress such as construction of infrastructure (border control centers, security fences systems, etc.). All of these metrics would be designed jointly in the plans branch and agreed upon by all parties. Evaluators can also serve as ongoing compliance monitors.

The SIVG evaluation and monitoring branch would also employ operational assessment through a series of exercises and evaluations to vet and test various security systems and consider improvements. For example, in the event of transfer of elements of airspace or border security, the associated systems would be subjected to joint military exercises that test these capabilities. These assessments would not end after a handover of responsibility to Palestinian forces but would instead go on, with the monitoring branch of the SIVG continuing to evaluate Palestinian performance and guarding against an erosion in their capabilities. A critical function of the SIVG will be to ensure that there is no backsliding after a particular milestone has been hit, a major concern for Israeli security officials. This branch will continuously monitor PASF performance throughout Phase V with ongoing observation, including planned and no-notice exercises and operational testing of various security systems and personnel to ensure they continue to meet or exceed the agreed standards.

Phase I: Early Visible Steps on the Ground

Once a two-state agreement is reached, significant visible gains can be made on the ground in relatively short order with no degradation to the security of Israelis or Palestinians. A number of areas should be addressed immediately. First, all Israeli incursions into Palestinian-controlled Area A should cease outside of extreme emergency situations. Moreover, very early on Israel can turn over significant portions of Area C to Palestinian civil control with no adverse effects on security and eliminate any impediments to movement that are not strictly necessary for security as opposed to political purposes. Likewise, in the northern quarter of the West Bank where there are relatively few settlements, movement and access can be expanded quickly and handover of

security in some parts of Area C in the northern West Bank can occur almost immediately. Beyond that, working with the United States the parties should move very rapidly to eliminate visible presence of the ISF at the border crossings between Jordan and Palestine. Much of the infrastructure necessary to support such a system can be put in place today and improve security within the current context, while enabling a rapid transition early on. Israel can also pass a settler relocation compensation law and, with the help of the international community, incentivize thousands of nonideological settlers (who make up a large portion of the settler population) to leave areas of the West Bank that will become part of a Palestinian state.⁶⁸ These very visible and early steps that demonstrate the forthcoming end of the occupation should buy time and space for the more difficult security steps that will take longer to implement.

Phases II, III, and IV: A Conditions-Dependent Redeployment with Target Timetables

To illustrate the work of the SIVG, consider an example in the ground security domain outlined in Figure 6. (The domains of air, maritime, and EMS would each have their own lines of effort, analogous but distinct from the examples below.) Within the ground domain, there would be many primary, secondary, tertiary, etc., lines of effort.

The bulk of the work would be done in Phase II (Construct, Train, Equip, Evaluate). As mentioned, every line of effort and associated subordinate lines of effort would have target timetables, milestones, and clear, objective, measurable, performance-based metrics. Detailed, objective, comprehensive metrics and tasks, agreed upon by all parties during planning, lower the chances of disagreements later.

Within each line of effort, there will be a series of milestones (Figure 6) that stand for measures of progress, such as completion of construction of a facility or a successful evaluation of an individual security unit. "Key milestones" are achieved by the accumulation of a defined set of regular milestones. Key milestones connect activity across phases, particularly between Phase II (Construct, Train, Equip, and Evaluate the PASF) and Phase IV (Redeploy the IDF).

To illustrate, consider the geographical area in and around Tulkarem. Recall the assumptions that by this point (initiation of a transition plan), a two-state agreement would have been signed, final borders would have been decided, and the fate of nearby settlements determined. For illustration purposes, LoE 1 is adjustment and completion of the security barrier along the agreed

FIGURE 6.

Lines of Effort Associated With a Ground Security Transition Process**I. BORDER TRACE****A. Border Trace Security Fence System Infrastructure**

- i. Detailed geographical/topographical study and route planning
- ii. Construction of primary fences
- iii. Installation and connection of sensor systems
- iv. Construction of patrol roads and tracker roads
- v. Construction of outer fences
- vi. Design, manufacture, installation, and connection of aerostats
- vii. Etc.

B. Construction of Border Control Centers

- i. Design and construction of buildings
- ii. Installation of communications, command, and control equipment
- iii. Connection to all border trace sensors
- iv. Etc.

II. BORDER-CROSSING POINTS**A. Border-Crossing-Point Infrastructure**

- i. Design and construction of buildings
- ii. Procurement and installation of personnel and baggage screening equipment
- iii. Etc.

B. Training of Palestinian Border Guards**C. Training of Palestinian Customs Police****D. Equipping of Palestinian Border Guards****E. Equipping of Palestinian Customs Police****F. Creation of Passport and Visa Regime**

- i. Creation of personnel database
- ii. Installation of biometric data collection equipment
- iii. Training of personnel on biometric data collection equipment
- iv. Collection of biometric and personal data
- v. Design of procedures for categories of personnel
 - a. *VIPs/diplomats*
 - b. *"Global Entry/TSA Pre-Check"-like categories*
 - c. *General public*
 - d. *Short-notice crossings (medical emergencies, etc.)*

G. Etc.**III. GENERAL PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES****A. Conduct Security Needs Assessment**

- i. Current vs. future needs
- ii. Optimal force structure
- iii. Identify differing requirements for occupation vs. domestic security forces

B. Conduct Current Performance Assessment**C. Agreement From All Parties on Needed Capabilities****D. Training Plan to Close the Gap Between Current and Needed Capabilities**

- i. Physical fitness
- ii. Marksmanship
- iii. Small-team operations
- iv. Cordon operations
- v. Command and control
- vi. Etc.

IV. Counterterrorism Force**A. CT Force Training**

- i. Personnel selection and vetting
- ii. Physical fitness
- iii. Marksmanship
- iv. Small-team operations
- v. Cordon operations
- vi. Breaching operations
- vii. Close-quarters combat
- viii. Personnel capture
- ix. Site exploitation
- x. Communications
- xi. Mobility
- xii. Etc.

B. CT Force Equipping

- i. Determine capabilities needed
- ii. Approval by all parties
- iii. Identify and procure weapons and equipment to meet approved capabilities
- iv. Etc.

V. Counterterrorism System**A. Design Intelligence-Sharing Mechanisms and Infrastructure****B. Identify, Vet, Recruit, and Protect Intelligence Officers****C. Identify, Vet, Recruit, and Protect Judges****D. Identify, Vet, Recruit, and Protect Prosecutors****E. Identify, Vet, Recruit, and Protect Detention Officers****F. Design and Construct CT System Infrastructure**

- i. Perimeter security
- ii. Buildings
- iii. Courtrooms
- iv. Evidence collection, recording, tracking, and storage systems
- v. Forensics labs
- vi. Detention facilities
 - a. *Short term*
 - b. *Long term*

G. Etc.

border between Israel and the west side of Palestine in the vicinity of Tulkarem. LoE 2 is the training and equipping of a PASF unit that will assume security responsibility for the area in and around Tulkarem. LoE 3 is the training and equipping of the CT force and LoE 4 is the rest of the Counterterrorism System.

Each of the LoEs would have very detailed secondary and tertiary LoEs under them. LoE 1, for example, would have sub-LoEs such as: detailed geographical/topographical study and route planning; construction of primary fences; installation and connection of sensor systems; etc. LoE 2 would have sub-LoEs such as physical fitness; marksmanship; first aid; small-team operations; cordon and search operations; etc. The sub-LoE of marksmanship would be further delineated into detailed tasks, conditions, and standards such as:

TASK
Engage single targets with the M16-/M4-series weapon.

CONDITIONS
Day, given an M16-/M4-series weapon, with helmet and LCE, on a known-distance or modified field fire range. Engage F- and E-type silhouette targets at 75 meters with five rounds from the unsupported and five rounds from the supported firing positions. Engage the 175-meter target with 10 rounds from the unsupported and 10 rounds from the supported firing position. Engage the 300-meter target with five rounds from the unsupported and five rounds from the supported firing positions.

STANDARDS
Demonstrate consistent application of the four fundamentals in the integrated act of shooting. Obtain eight hits out of 10 shots on the 75-meter target; 14 hits out of 20 shots on the 175-meter target; and five hits out of 10 shots on the 300-meter target.

Other tasks under marksmanship would include weapon loading, unloading, firing, clearing malfunctions, cleaning, maintaining, etc. Every member of the unit would have to pass evaluations on every marksmanship task and on every other sub-LoE (such as physical fitness, first aid, etc.).

Once all individuals of the unit are able to pass their individual evaluations, their skills would be aggregated into group tasks and capabilities (such as small-team operations, cordon operations, etc.), which would likewise have detailed LoEs and associated tasks, conditions, and standards. An example of a cordon and search operation task, conditions, and standards follows.

Once the unit successfully completed training and evaluation on all its individual and group tasks, it would be declared “mission ready.” In similar manner, Lines of

TASK
Conduct a cordon and search operation as a battalion.

CONDITIONS
Day and night, all weather. Battalion-size unit. Area the size of one city block.

STANDARDS
Demonstrate consistent application of the fundamentals of cordon and search operations. Cordon and search an urban area the size of one city block in under four hours. Demonstrate proper road-block procedures to include traffic control, vehicle search, over watch. Demonstrate proper perimeter security procedures. Demonstrate proper breaching procedures. Demonstrate proper building search and clearing procedures.

Effort 3 and 4 would direct the training and equipping of the CT force, and the design and construction of the rest of the CT system. When all four LoEs (in this example) are complete, the overall effort will have reached a key milestone (Figure 6). When the associated key milestone is reached in Phase III for the Tulkarem area (relocation of the residents from nearby settlements that are in the territorial boundaries of the new Palestinian state), then conditions would be met for transfer of authority for security responsibility for the Tulkarem zone to the PASF and redeployment of the IDF from that area.

Ideally, there should be consensus among the evaluators of the SIVG that a specific criterion has been met. But this creates concerns for Palestinians who fear that the Israelis would use such a mechanism to veto transition progress and, therefore, Israeli redeployment would never materialize. Israeli security professionals, by contrast, have two different predominant fears regarding a two-state agreement: (1) They fear that the PASF will not be able to conduct its security functions; and even more important, (2) they fear that PASF units will not be willing to conduct their missions.

The SIVG model addresses both sides’ fears by creating a joint decisionmaking mechanism along with a remediation process to resolve disagreements. The evaluation and monitoring branch will be jointly led by an American, Israeli, and Palestinian, all at the colonel level or equivalent. If the evaluators agreed that a PASF unit did not pass an evaluation, then the remediation process would kick in. The SIVG plans branch would develop a remediation plan to fill the gaps in performance, and the training branch would execute that plan. In general, the remediation plan should not require more than half the time of the original training plan for that area or function. The evaluation branch would then re-evaluate the unit. Transition would not proceed until that unit’s performance had been corrected and verified.

If the evaluators within the branch could not agree on the outcome of an evaluation (i.e., if the United States and Palestinian evaluators thought the unit passed but the Israeli evaluator thought it failed), then the unit would enter the remediation process. If after that round of remediation the evaluators still did not agree, they would elevate the issue to the two- and three-star level of the SIVG's leadership. If there were no agreement at the flag officer level, then the issue would have to be taken outside the SIVG to an envoy level or above for a political discussion.

The monitors would continue to evaluate PASF units after a transfer has occurred. If a PASF unit that had already assumed responsibility for a given area subsequently failed to execute its mission, overall transfer of responsibility across all of Palestine would cease until the situation was corrected and verified. This invokes a high cost of failure on the Palestinians. That said, it is highly likely that PASF units will strive to maintain or exceed capability and performance standards because their superior and continuous performance will equate to faster transition to their authority, which matters greatly for their dignity.

In general, transfer of authority for security responsibility will occur in a phased manner across the West Bank rather than all at once, as illustrated in the Tulkarem example above. Likewise, on the eastern border of Palestine, along the Jordan River, the entire border does not have to transfer at one time. It is very important that the visible security presence at the crossing points changes early in Phase 1 from Israeli to Palestinian, as noted above. The rest of the border can be transferred in pieces over time as the border trace security system is completed and as PASF border security units finish their training and pass evaluation. The size and location of the increments will be decided by all parties within the SIVG.

Third Party/U.S. Force

Another major challenge will be developing the appropriate role for, and getting Israelis to agree to, a third-party force. The parties have very different visions for this force. The Palestinians prefer that the IDF withdraw immediately and a third-party force take over all security functions that the PASF is unable to perform. Over time, as the PASF becomes more capable, the international force's role would be reduced. The Israelis are deeply suspicious of international forces, believing that they will collapse at the first sign of trouble and withdraw.

The answer to both challenges is a primarily American force with some international elements for training, but Americans in position of monitoring and evaluating progress and overseeing the SIVG. The United States has maintained its unwavering security commitment to Israel over the course not of months or years, but of decades, providing tens of billions of dollars in security assistance, maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge over all of its neighbors, and backing Israel diplomatically. In spite of occasional disagreements between the leaders of the two states, the United States has maintained unquestionable security support to Israel. Israelis seem to trust the United States to help with their nation's security. And the reality is that in most cases the layered approach still gives Israel the opportunity to defend itself by itself in extreme cases, but creates additional layers so that hopefully it does not need to come to that and Palestinian sovereignty can be respected. Palestinians have openly

In spite of occasional disagreements between the leaders of the two states, the United States has maintained unquestionable security support to Israel.

expressed their willingness to trust American security forces to help the transition to a state of Palestine.

A U.S. force would play three central roles. First, it would be primarily responsible for training of Palestinian security forces. Indeed, through the USSC mission this is already a role that the United States leads with close cooperation from a number of key partner states.

The second major role would involve planning, evaluating and monitoring training and compliance with the agreement. To make determinations on progress, the SIVG will need to draw on data and information based on conditions on the ground that are drawn from military evaluation teams. Those teams should include Israelis and Palestinians but ultimately must be primarily led and driven by an American force that would play an objective mediating role in measuring progress.

A final role for U.S. forces would be operational. Some Israelis are quite resistant to the third party playing any operational role, for fear that it will abandon its post in a time of danger, limit Israeli military options, or become a party to the conflict in the event of an

incident. Meanwhile, the Palestinians would prefer to give the third-party force wide breadth if it meant getting the IDF out quickly and would like this force to replace as many IDF functions as possible, as quickly as possible. The most sensible solution would be for the U.S. force to assume responsibility for specific highly sensitive elements that the IDF does not trust the PASF to perform, but that the PASF would be unwilling to yield to Israel.

We have identified two operational tasks for this force beyond implementation of the agreement. The first would be to conduct patrols on the border with Jordan and provide additional monitoring at the border-crossing points. This has been described in more detail in Chapter 2 and is our preferred option, but one of a number that we outline.

The other operational role for the U.S. force would be as a liaison element to the joint intelligence and counterterrorism centers, where it could play a role in facilitating intelligence sharing and help the parties agree on particularly contentious operations. A third-party force would *not* be able to play a role embedded deep inside Palestinian cities or where it would be playing a significant role in detaining potential criminals or neutralizing security threats. This would create an untenable situation for all the parties.

The size of the U.S. force will depend on the tasks assigned to it, but based on the roles described above, we estimate a total American force of 300 to 800. While some have raised questions about whether the American public would support such a deployment, in the context of a two-state agreement it is highly likely that there would be support from the public and in the U.S. political system. The level of forces being discussed is relatively small, as is the risk of significant casualties. Indeed, the United States will have more forces in Afghanistan when President Barack Obama leaves office than the number of forces that would be required for this mission.⁶⁹ Moreover, given the strong support for Israel in the United States and the case for a U.S. role in a historic conflict-ending agreement, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which the American public rejects what is such a small force for such a significant achievement.



CHAPTER 8

Steps to Be Taken Today, Prior to an Agreement

Many of the elements described in the security system can only be implemented in the event of an agreement. However, some can begin now and could lead to security improvements for Israelis and Palestinians alike. Below, each of the major areas of the security architecture is assessed. The components recommended are selected for their positive, immediate impact on the street in the West Bank and Gaza. For the purpose of this analysis, the paper limits itself strictly to elements that would be part of an end-state security system. However, there are many recommendations others make about ways to improve today's environment that are outside the scope of this study. One such set of recommendations is contained in the Security First plan being released by Commanders for Israel's Security.⁷⁰

Internal Security

Palestinian security forces are well trained and equipped for their current mission set. Their proficiency needs to be carefully maintained, especially in basic law enforcement, disaster response, and command and control of their forces. New mission sets and the upper limit of their capabilities will be delineated in a two-state agreement.

However, selected portions of the counterterrorism system are good candidates for implementation now as they require some of the longest lead times and, more importantly, could significantly improve the capacity of Israelis and Palestinians to work together against terrorism. The complete system would contain: (1) a special intelligence apparatus; (2) counterterrorism forces; (3) forensics exploitation teams; (4) a court system to prosecute the cases; and (5) a stand-alone detention system.

The most important elements that need to be further developed are the forensics exploitation and a court system to prosecute cases. This would over time eliminate the “revolving door” concern of the Israelis regarding Palestinian ability to hold suspects. More funds and training can be put today to forensics exploitation, analysis, and storage system with vetted experts and accountable evidence custody chain from site exploitation to prosecution. Work can also begin shortly on an evidence collection, analysis, and storage system as well as a court system to prosecute cases with vetted and

Selected portions of the counterterrorism system are good candidates for implementation now as they require some of the longest lead times and, more importantly, could significantly improve the capacity of Israelis and Palestinians to work together against terrorism.

protected judges and prosecutors. The creation of an independent, vetted, protected court system will be one of the most time-consuming portions of the CT system. However, lessons learned from the initial stages of this endeavor can be applied to good governance initiatives across the next Palestinian system of governance; therefore, early investment in facilities, judges, prosecutors, clerks, etc., would be well worth the effort.

Counterterrorism forces would be a special unit drawn from current PA security forces and trained/equipped to a higher level of capability. That capacity can also be improved today, though it will take less time to build this capability than the accompanying court system.

The other elements of the system are more developed at this stage. The intelligence apparatus is already partially in place. After an agreement is signed, its technical collection capabilities can be augmented. Vetting standards for personnel may need to be made more transparent to the other parties.

The construction of a stand-alone detention facility would be resource-intensive. The training of detention officers would not take long in relative terms, but thorough vetting of these personnel would be crucial to successfully eliminate the revolving-door problem. However, given political sensitivities, building such a facility today would send highly negative signals to the Palestinian public. It should probably wait until after an agreement is signed.

Border Security

Improved infrastructure for border-crossing-point facilities and border control centers should begin immediately as should design on a passport/visa system that includes biometrics and shared databases. Not only would such measures improve security for all sides, they could also facilitate faster movement and improvement in the daily lives of Palestinians, Israelis, and Jordanians currently crossing this border. Moreover, the more work that can be done now on such a system, the more quickly it could transition to Palestinian control in the event of an agreement. And this could then be one of the items that would occur relatively early after an agreement but come with significant and visible symbolic importance to the Palestinians.

Construction of the border trace layered security system would be resource-intensive and could send the wrong message to the Palestinian public if initiated prior to the attainment of a two-state agreement. Palestinians could misinterpret construction of walls and security fences prior to an agreement as an attempt by Israel to annex the West Bank. That could trigger protest and unrest, the exact opposite of the intention of these proposals. Therefore, this component of the framework should not commence until the signing of an agreement.

Airspace Security

Although airspace arrangements would not be visible to the Palestinian public, a public announcement that technical experts from both sides were gathering to begin planning the arrangements would provide a powerful signal to the Palestinian public that real change was underway. Likewise, even if physical construction of airport facilities could not begin for some time, commencement of the planning activities required to undertake such a venture, such as the formation of a feasibility study committee, or international financial commitments that would be contingent on a permanent status agreement, would also signal tangible progress. That said, early airport construction should be strongly considered as an early means of injecting economic stimulus into the Palestinian economy. As long as construction materials are not diverted to nefarious projects, construction of airport infrastructure poses no threat to Israel.

Maritime Security

Maritime components of the security system can provide immediate benefit to the Palestinian public, either before or after consolidation of Palestinian governance under a single authority. At a minimum, a planning process can begin today that includes feasibility assessments, design experts, and even international financial commitments for a future port in the event of an agreement.

It may be possible to go beyond planning. Gaza is in desperate need of development aid, yet extremist groups in Gaza remain a threat to Israel. Close monitoring would be needed to ensure construction materials are not diverted to nefarious activities. However, if that can be accomplished, then perhaps some construction on a temporary port facility could commence. If the “Gaza Island” port solution were pursued, then construction could commence on the island, the bridge, or the terminal at the end of the bridge. Any such activity would give a signal to the Palestinian public in Gaza that the economic situation on the ground was improving.

Electromagnetic Spectrum Security

Improvements in the management for security of the electromagnetic spectrum might not be evident to the general public, unless it involved greater access to 3G or 4G cellular technology. This could improve the daily lives of Palestinians and therefore would serve to lower current tensions. Beginning to do work now on improving the overall efficiency of the EMS and how it is shared would come with little cost but should not be a high priority.

Regional Security

Since its introduction by Saudi Arabia and the adoption of a somewhat revised version by the Arab League in 2002, the Arab Peace Initiative marked the end of decades of collective refusal to engage Israel, as encapsulated in the league’s “three no’s” of 1967 (no negotiations, no recognition, no peace). Also embraced by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the API held the promise for Israel of normalized relations with 57 Arab and other Islamic nations.

Although the API was designed primarily to encourage a negotiated resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Arab officials have indicated repeatedly, both privately and in public, both via third parties and to Israelis directly, that acceptance of the initiative by Israel is key to its integration into regional security cooperation.

Despite the far-reaching promise encapsulated in the API, thus far there has been no official Israeli response. Unofficially, Israelis express doubts about the sincerity of the offer and suspicion concerning its language. However, re-examining this offer and considering some kind of public response, even one that does not fully embrace all elements of the API, would be a useful step that could be pursued today to set conditions for better regional security cooperation.



Conclusion

Israelis and Palestinians today are far from a two-state agreement. Confidence among the populations remains extraordinarily low. We recognize that a two-state agreement is not on the immediate horizon. Despite this challenge, the good news is that cooperation among Israeli and Palestinian security officials is growing stronger and more effective. We hope that in the future, when negotiators eventually return to the table, the proposals described in this study can provide a useful input and that even today some of the ideas outlined can be implemented in the near term.

More importantly, we hope that this report can generate a discussion both in Israeli and Palestinian society about how to meet Israeli security requirements in a way that is compatible with Palestinian needs for dignity and sovereignty. After comprehensively studying this issue, we are convinced that security arrangements that meet both parties' requirements are indeed possible and should not stand in the way of coming to a permanent status agreement. We hope this effort can convince others that well-thought-through solutions can meet both sides' needs and that security is not the insurmountable challenge that blocks the possibility of the two-state solution.

Endnotes

1. While recognizing that there is currently no universally recognized Palestinian state, the study assumes that under a permanent status agreement such a state would exist. Since the study's focus is on a post-permanent status agreement world, it refers interchangeably to "Palestine," "the new Palestinian state," and "the future Palestinian state."
2. PASF refers to all security organizations under the purview of the Palestinian Authority or, in the event of an agreement, under the authority of the future state of Palestine. To reduce confusion, the acronym PASF will be used throughout.
3. The term "Israeli security forces" is a general one; it encompasses all security organizations within Israel, such as the Israel Defense Forces (Israel's military), the Israel Police, the Border Police, intelligence units, and all other Israeli security organizations.
4. The Oslo II accord divided the West Bank into three administrative divisions. Area A includes 18% of the West Bank including most Palestinian urban areas and the large majority of the Palestinian population. The Palestinian Authority is responsible for civil administration and security in this area.
5. IDF redeployment would entail transfer of authority for security to the PASF for a given geographical area and the physical departure of Israeli security forces from that area.
6. The Arab Peace Initiative is a 10-point proposal endorsed by the Arab League in 2002 that outlines conditions for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. "Arab peace initiative: full text," *The Guardian*, March 28, 2002, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/28/israel7>.
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